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INTRODUCTION 
The disjunction between constitutional text and present-
day federal trial practice could not be more pronounced.  
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution mandates that “[t]he 
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by 
jury.”1  Yet in modern America not all federal criminal trials 
are by jury.  If Article III’s command were taken literally, all 
federal criminal trials would involve juries and there would 
be no bench trials for criminal offenses.2  Yet in recent years, 
bench trials account for approximately 13.6% of federal felony 
prosecutions that go to trial,3 and 58% of all federal criminal 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  
 2. This Article concerns only federal criminal trials in the civil justice 
system.  Except for the discussion in note 104 this Article does not consider 
criminal-trial practice in the military and admiralty courts.  See infra note 104.  
Nor does it discuss non-jury trials in the now abolished system of consular 
courts.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1957) (discussing trial by jury in 
consular courts); id. at 86–87 (Clark, J., dissenting) (discussing the demise  
of consular courts). The disjunction between constitutional text and trial 
procedure in those courts will be the topic of a subsequent paper.    This Article 
also does not consider federal criminal prosecutions which are resolved by guilty 
pleas.  At present, approximately 85% of federal criminal convictions are 
secured by guilty pleas.  See Table 4.2. Disposition of Criminal Cases 
Terminated, by Offense During October 1, 2006 – September 30, 2007, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2196 (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2010).  It is generally accepted that guilty pleas obviate the 
need for a trial, and therefore, for a jury.  See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 
U.S. 65, 81–82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); West v. Gammon, 98 F. 426, 429 
(6th Cir. 1899).  In addition, guilty pleas were a recognized alternative to jury 
trial at common law.  The interpretive convention that constitutional terms may 
be defined by the principles and practices of the English common law of 1789 
supports permitting guilty pleas.  See, e.g., Schick, 195 U.S. at 69 (saying “the 
Constitution . . . must be read in light of the common law”); Callan v. Wilson, 
127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888) (stating and applying the convention to Article III’s 
jury trial provision); West, 98 F. at 428–29 (stating and applying the convention 
to guilty pleas).  But see WILLIAM ATWELL, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
LAW PROCEDURE 26–27 (3d ed. 1922) (arguing that “permitting pleas of guilty to 
be taken in felony cases” is unconstitutional); Laura I. Appleman, The Lost 
Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 398, 440, 446 (2009) 
(questioning the constitutionality of guilty pleas). 
 3. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 244 tbl.D-4 
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trials.4  Some of these bench trials occur because defendants 
have waived their right to a jury.5  Others occur because 
defendants are charged with what is regarded as a “petty” 
offense and the Supreme Court has held that Article III’s jury 
trial mandate applies only to crimes that are “serious.”6  For 
petty offenses, the federal government is free to allow or 
disallow jury trial as it sees fit regardless of the defendants’ 
wishes.7 
In other words, the Supreme Court has read two 
exceptions into Article III’s absolute textual requirement.8  
(2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial 
Business/2008/front/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.  It should be noted that in 
state courts, around 60% of all felony trials are nonjury.  See State Court 
Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004—Table 4.1. Distribution of Types of Felony 
Convictions in State Courts, by Offense, 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04401tab.cfm# (last 
updated Oct. 22, 2011). 
 4. I derive this figure by adding to the statistics on Table D-4, 2008 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 244 tbl.D-4; the statistics on Table M-1A 
Class A Misdemeanor Defendants Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges, by 
Type of Disposition; and Table M-2A Petty Offense Defendants Disposed of by 
U.S. Magistrate Judges, by Type of Disposition, id. at 358 tbl.M-1A, 364 tbl.M-
2A.  These additional trials are conducted by federal magistrates, not Article III 
judges.  I include them because magistrate criminal trials are permissible only 
because of the petty crime and jury waiver exceptions discussed in this Article. 
 5. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298–300 (1930) 
(upholding defendant’s jury waiver in a federal criminal trial), abrogated by 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).  
 6. The line between “petty” and “serious” crime has varied over the years.  
Compare Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (offenses 
punishable by a maximum prison term of six months or a maximum fine of $500 
are considered petty), with D.C. v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625–26 (1937) 
(distinguishing petty from serious crime through complex balancing test), and 
Comment, The Petty Offense Category and Trial by Jury, 40 YALE L.J. 1303, 
1306 (1931) (discussing the federal courts’ “flexible test”).  Suffice it to say that 
the Supreme Court has always said that all felonies are “serious” offenses, while 
some misdemeanors are “serious” and others are “petty.”  See, e.g., Callan v. 
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1888).  The current line between petty and 
serious crime is defined by Blanton.  Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. 
 7. See, e.g., Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 7 (1994).  
 8. For convenience, I am considering only criminal prosecutions of 
civilians.  There is no jury trial right in the military justice system.  See Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1942).  I believe, but will not demonstrate, that 
there is no textual warrant for the military trial exception.  However, it so 
clearly comports with the unquestioned practice of military justice before, 
during, and after the Founding that it is proper to conclude that military trials 
were intended to be outside the scope of Article III, Section 2’s command.  
Although aspects of the military justice exception have evolved with 
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One of these exceptions, the petty offense exception, may be 
justified by English, colonial, and Founding-era practices.9  
Before, during, and after the period of constitution-making, 
minor criminal offenses were subject to summary trial. 10  
Criminal procedure contemporary with the Founding strongly 
suggests that the Constitution was unlikely to require juries 
for every federal criminal prosecution no matter how trivial.11 
The second exception—for federal bench trials for serious 
criminal offenses when the defendant has waived his right to 
a jury—is another matter.  Federal bench trials premised 
upon defendant’s jury waiver cannot be justified by 
constitutional text, common law history, or Founding-era 
practices.12  By the norms of any textualist or originalist 
jurisprudence, federal bench trials for serious crimes are 
unconstitutional even when defendants request them.  They 
may be justified only by jurisprudences that allow for 
evolving principles and a “living constitution.” 
Moreover, for one-hundred-forty years after the 
Founding, federal practice, professional opinion, and Supreme 
Court precedent agreed that bench trials for serious criminal 
contemporary constitutional norms, the exception itself is consonant with 
Founding-era norms that have remained constant.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1 (1957) (holding even when living overseas, civilian dependents of military 
personnel have a right to a jury trial).  For many years criminal contempt of 
court was an additional exception to the jury trial requirement.  This exception 
was grounded in common law tradition.  See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 F. 
Cas. 359, 364–65, 367 (C.C. Pa. 1801) (No. 6,616).  Now criminal contempt 
convictions are subject to a jury trial requirement that is consonant with the 
rules that distinguish petty from serious crime.  Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions 
for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 
692–95, 732 n.422 (2008). 
 9. Whether these practices justify the petty offense exception depends on 
one’s jurisprudence.  As I will discuss in a subsequent article, textualism may 
not find them sufficient. 
 10. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 32 (1965); 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280–83; Felix Frankfurter & Thomas Corcoran, 
Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 
HARV. L. REV. 917, 922–65 (1926).  
 11. I make this assertion with two caveats.  First, there is some evidentiary 
basis for concluding that Article III’s jury trial provision was meant to enact an 
encompassing ban.  Second, there is convincing evidence that the line now 
drawn between petty and serious offenses reflects contemporary policy views 
rather than Founding-era practices.  These caveats will be the topic of a 
subsequent paper. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 24–69. 
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offenses were barred by Article III’s jury-trial mandate.13  
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, in his 1890 Lectures on 
the Constitution, captured the uniform thinking of Founding 
era and nineteenth century American jurists when he said 
that “the language used in Article III is peremptory that ‘the 
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by 
jury.’  This language excludes other all modes, whether with 
or without consent of the party.”14  
Nonetheless, in Patton v. United States, 15  decided in 
1930, a unanimous Supreme Court declared federal  
bench trials constitutionally  permissible.16  The author of the 
opinion, Justice George Sutherland, was second to none in his 
commitment to the view that the sole goal of constitutional 
interpretation is to maintain and effectuate the Constitution’s 
original meaning.17  Employing his originalist approach in 
Patton, Sutherland maintained that defendants’ jury waiver 
and federal bench trials for serious offenses were consistent 
with Article III’s original understanding.18 
However, in Patton, Justice Sutherland got his history 
wrong.  Thus this Article joins the long list of books and 
articles questioning the Supreme Court’s use of history as a 
basis for its decisions.19  In addition, by studying how evolving 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 70–104, 169–70. 
 14. SAMUEL MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 500 (1891) (emphasis in original) (second emphasis added).  Miller 
continued that “[a] party may, however, confess his guilt by a plea of guilty, and 
judgment may be passed upon that plea, yet if there is an issue of fact which 
has to be tried, that trial can only be by a jury.”  Id.; see also William Handley, 
Jr., Some Observations on Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 1 TEX. L. & 
LEG. 45, 48 (1947) (saying Article III’s jury provision “would seem to be 
mandatory in nature and for many years were so construed by the federal 
courts”). 
 15. 281 U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970). 
 16. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297–98 (1930). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 183–91.  
 18. Since this Article’s focus is solely on jury waiver in prosecutions for 
“serious” crimes, from this point on the unmodified terms “offenses” and 
“crimes” should be understood to mean “serious offenses” and “serious crimes.”  
When it speaks of “petty” offenses, it will employ the adjective “petty.” 
 19. See, e.g., CHARLES MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF 
HISTORY 68–69, 195–96 (1969) (explicating examples of the Court’s “misuse” of 
history); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); Alfred 
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965); 
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principles of constitutional policy transformed the 
interpretation of Article III, Section 2’s clear text, this Article 
reveals an important mechanism through which evolving 
principles of constitutional policy become the basis for 
constitutional law even in the hands of dedicated 
originalists:20 “motivated reasoning.”21 
This Article is a study of the problem that motivated 
reasoning presents for the practice of originalist 
jurisprudence, and to that extent, it is an argument for the 
desirability of a forthright jurisprudence of “living 
constitutionalism.” 
Part I discusses the history of the “no-waiver” rule which 
the Patton case overturned.  Part I demonstrates that 
constitutional text, common law tradition, early federal 
practice, Supreme Court precedent and nineteenth-century 
legal theory all support the conclusion that Article III’s jury 
provision established a per se rule banning bench trials 
regardless of defendants’ consent.  It is written from the 
perspective of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
lawyers and judges in order to establish both the original 
understanding of the Constitution on the subject of 
defendants’ jury waiver and adherence to that understanding 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
Part II studies the first three decades of the twentieth 
century to show that although there were a few dissenting 
voices, the no-waiver rule remained solidly in place until the 
Patton decision.  Part III discusses Patton and is divided into 
two sections.  The first section analyzes Justice Sutherland’s 
opinion to show that its attempt to ground the 
constitutionality of federal bench trials in the Constitution’s 
David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original 
Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in 
Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009) (criticizing the Court’s use 
of history in D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)); Sanford Levinson, For Whom is 
the Heller Opinion Important and Why?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 315, 327 
(2009) (criticizing both the majority’s and minority’s use of history in D.C. v. 
Heller).  
 20. At least originalists on the bench, where despite teams of clerks there is 
less time for study and, despite life tenure, greater pressure not to follow the 
dictates of history even when they are discernible than there is among 
originalists in the legal academy. 
 21. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 480 (1990); see infra notes 408–33. 
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original meaning is remarkably inadequate for establishing 
its revisionist claims.  The second section accounts for Justice 
Sutherland’s jejune opinion.  After discussing social, legal, 
and historiographical developments in the 1920s, the second 
section portrays the Patton Court’s departure from the clear 
command of the Constitution’s text, tradition, and precedent 
not as bad-faith “result-oriented” jurisprudence but as an 
example of “motivated reasoning,” a largely unconscious and 
uncontrollable process. 
Part IV concludes with the implications of this analysis 
for the debate between originalist and “living” 
constitutionalism.  It argues that motivated reasoning is so 
endemic to lawyers and judges when they “do history” that it 
has jurisprudential ramifications in our increasingly 
originalist era.  Historians have long questioned the Supreme 
Court’s use of history.22  The psychological phenomenon of 
“motivated reasoning” provides an explanation for why the 
Justices will never be good historians and suggests that we 
should think long and hard before continuing our current 
embrace of Clio as the determining metric of contemporary 
government structure and civil liberties. 
I. ARTICLE III’S JURY TRIAL MANDATE FROM THE FOUNDING 
TO 1900: THE NO-WAIVER RULE ESTABLISHED AND RESPECTED 
The goal of this part is two-fold: to establish that the 
original meaning of Article III’s jury trial mandate did not 
permit jury waiver, and that this “no-waiver” understanding 
was respected throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  This combined goal will be accomplished by 
discussing the law from the perspective of a late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century jurist because the ultimate 
purpose of this Article is to contrast what was believed to be 
true in 1900 with what came to be accepted in 1930.  I am 
less interested in determining the Constitution’s “true” 
original meaning with respect to jury waiver, although I 
think I do that, than in illustrating how beliefs about original 
meaning change over time. 
 
 22. See Stephen A. Siegel, How Many Critiques Must Historians Write?, 45 
TULSA L. REV. 823, 823–24 (2010) (book review).  
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A snapshot of constitutional law in 1900 shows that 
defendants who plead not guilty in federal criminal trials 
could not waive a jury trial.23  There was near universal 
agreement among late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century judges, lawyers and commentators that the no-waiver 
rule was fully justified by the Constitution’s text, English and 
colonial tradition, early federal practice, Supreme Court 
precedent, and legal theory. 
A.  The Constitution’s Text 
To late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century jurists, 
Article III, Section 2 was an “explicit”24 and “peremptory”25 
provision mandating “that in the trial of criminal causes 
other than impeachments a jury could not be dispensed with 
by consent of the accused or otherwise.”26  “The provisions of 
section 2 of article 3”, they said, “point out absolutely the 
tribunal which must dispose of the crimes to which they 
refer,”27 and that “tribunal . . . consists of a jury, and . . . a 
court . . . with a judge or judges.” 28   Jury waiver was 
impossible because “no prosecuting officer nor any person 
accused, whether acting separately or by agreement, can 
substitute . . . another tribunal for that which the letter of the 
Constitution designates.”29  As future Supreme Court Justice 
Horace Lurton wrote when he was still an appellate court 
judge, 
 23. I use the word “crime” to denote “serious,” not “petty,” offenses.  See 
cases cited supra notes 5–6 (discussing the distinction between serious and 
petty crime).  
 24. State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 363–66 (1878) (distinguishing the state 
constitution’s jury provision from the federal constitution’s because of its 
differing draftsmanship). 
 25.  MILLER, supra note 14, at 500; see also Dickinson v. United States, 159 
F. 801, 806 (1st Cir. 1908). 
 26. In re Staff, 23 N.W. 587, 589 (Wis. 1885) (distinguishing state 
constitutions from the federal constitution because of differing draftsmanship); 
see also Note, Trial by Jury for Petty Offenses, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1905) 
(Article III, Section 2 “on its face, appears to be absolute, with the single 
mentioned exception”).  
 27. Dickinson, 159 F. at 806. 
 28. Id.; see also id. at 806–07 (“[T]he third article points out perfectly the 
elements of the tribunal authorized to proceed against persons accused of 
crimes like that before us, including equally the court, the judge and the 
jury . . . .”). 
 29. Id. at 806.  
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[Article III’s jury] provision is not one merely extending a 
privilege or guaranteeing a right.  It is all that and more.  
The “trial” of every such crime “shall be by jury.”  It goes 
to the constitution of the tribunal, and a “trial” for a 
“crime” which is not “by jury” is not a trial by any tribunal 
known to the Constitution.30 
According to Justice John Marshall Harlan, the near 
universally held view was that for serious crime: 
Under the express words of Constitution . . . . [t]he court 
and the jury, not separately, but together, constitute the 
appointed tribunal which alone, under the law, can try the 
question of crime, the commission of which by the accused 
is put in issue by a plea of not guilty.31 
If anything in the Constitution’s text casts a shadow of a 
doubt on Justices Lurton’s and Harlan’s propositions, it came 
not from Article III but from the Sixth Amendment which 
declared that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the state and district where in the crime shall have been 
committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense.32 
By common agreement, the Sixth Amendment’s 
introductory clause was “permissive”33 and allowed waiver of 
many of the trial-related rights the amendment mentions.34  
 30. Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 90 (6th Cir. 1909); see also MILLER, 
supra note 14, at 500 (quoting supra text accompanying note 14).  The only pre-
1900 source I have found that questions the no-waiver rule in federal 
prosecutions for serious crime is Belt v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 25 (D.C. Cir. 
1894). 
 31. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
Justice Harlan dissent in Schick objected to the Court’s recognition of the petty 
offense exception.  Id.  Harlan read Article III’s absolute text to prohibit jury 
waiver for petty, as well as for serious, offenses.  See id. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 33. Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 34; see also Low, 169 F. at 91 (discussing whether 
“verbiage” of the Sixth Amendment creates a waivable privilege).  But see Rollin 
Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases (pt. 1), 16 IOWA L. REV. 20, 
44 (1930) (noting that earlier in the nineteenth century it was common to read 
provisions similar to the Sixth Amendment as mandatory). 
 34. See, e.g., Schick, 195 U.S. at 71–72 (mentioning waivable Sixth 
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Many Gilded Age jurists thought the contrast between Article 
III’s peremptory, and the Sixth Amendment’s permissive, 
language created a tension between the two provisions.35  The 
tension stemmed from the fact that the Sixth Amendment 
customarily is read as guaranteeing the right to a jury trial as 
well as the trial’s accessory rights. 36   Reading the Sixth 
Amendment this way left the Constitution with two 
potentially conflicting jury trial guarantees.37  The conflict is 
that Article III’s jury provision is drafted with “absolute”38 
phrasing while the Sixth Amendment’s provision is embedded 
in language of personal privilege, which implies that it might 
be “enjoyed” or not at the defendant’s option.39  Gilded Age 
jurists thought that if the Constitution’s two criminal-jury-
trial provisions were in tension, this might support an 
Amendment rights); Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 810–11 (1st Cir. 
1908) (saying some Sixth Amendment rights are waivable and some are not); 
MILLER, supra note 14, at 499–500; James A. C. Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in 
Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 132, 147 (1931) (saying the Sixth Amendment 
“merely” provides that “ ‘ the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial by . . . 
jury’ ” ); Perkins, supra note 33, at 46 (contrasting Article III’s and the Sixth 
Amendment’s language).  
 35. It should be noted that some jurists thought the contrasting language 
provided additional intra-textual argument supporting the no-waiver 
understanding of Article III’s jury provision.  See Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 34. 
 36. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).  “[T]he Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial” was extended to the states in Duncan v. 
Louisiana.  Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 381 U.S. 145 (1968)).  See also, e.g., 
WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.1, at 1069 (5th ed. 2009) 
(discussing the “Sixth Amendment right to jury trial”); Sanjay Chhablani, 
Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 505–06, 511–12 
(2009); Matthew Ford, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth 
Amendment’s Right to Jury Trial Post-Booker, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2007); 
Grant, supra note 34, at 147.  By accessory rights I mean the adjunct rights, 
such as rights to counsel and confrontation that make a jury trial worth having. 
 37. I do not see the potential textual conflict.  Historically, Article III 
created the right to jury trial and the Sixth Amendment specified some of its 
appurtenant rights.  See infra text accompanying notes 42–46.  This historical 
understanding comports with the way the Sixth Amendment is written.  The 
Sixth Amendment reads simply as a specification of trial-related rights; the 
noun “trial” appears only as a referent for the adjectives “public,” and “speedy”; 
and the noun “jury” plays a similar role for the adjective “impartial.”  The Sixth 
Amendment clearly assumes a right to jury trial, a drafting approach that made 
sense in 1791 given Article III’s explicit guarantee.  I suspect the Sixth 
Amendment today is looked upon as a source of the trial right itself due to the 
belief, which is analytically incorrect, that for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
incorporate a trial guarantee against the states it must be in the Bill of Rights. 
 38. Note, supra note 26, at 48. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (saying “the accused shall enjoy the right”). 
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argument that the Sixth Amendment’s permissive 
declaration, being the later enactment, “must control, under 
the well-understood rule that the last expression of the will of 
the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one.”40 
The suggestion that the Sixth Amendment was intended 
to supplant Article III’s jury provision was raised and 
authoritatively rejected by the Supreme Court in 1888 in 
Callan v. Wilson.41  “There is no necessary conflict between 
[the two constitutional provisions],”42 Justice Harlan wrote on 
behalf of a unanimous Court.  Article III guarantees trial  
by jury, without detailing the content of that right,  
Harlan noted.43  Therefore, “[T]he enumeration, in the sixth 
amendment, of the rights of the accused . . . is to be taken as 
a declaration of what those rules were, and is to be referred to 
the anxiety of the people of the states to have in the supreme 
law of the land . . . a full and distinct recognition of those 
rules.”44 
For Justice Harlan and the Callan Court, the absence of 
conflict between the Constitution’s two criminal-jury trial 
provisions meant that Article III, with its mandatory 
language, was the dominant provision and the Sixth 
Amendment, with its more privilege-like phraseology, was 
adopted to define with greater specificity “the essential 
features of the trial required by § 2 of article 3.”45  It was 
adopted not to weaken Article III’s jury trial mandate but to 
elaborate it and quiet the Antifederalists’ fears that, through 
lack of detail, Article III had enshrined an empty right.46  
That a criminal defendant might waive some of his common 
law trial rights, as specified in the Sixth Amendment, did not 
in any way undercut Article III’s absolute command that the 
 40. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904); Low v. United 
States, 169 F. 86, 91 (6th Cir. 1909); Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 
810–11 (1st Cir. 1908); Grant, supra note 34, at 147 n.105 (citing material on 
the “clash of opinion regarding the effect of Amendment 6 on Article III, § 2”). 
 41. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1888). 
 42. Id. at 548. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 549–50; see also Schick, 195 U.S. at 78 (Harlan, J. dissenting); cf. 
Low, 169 F. at 91 (reviewing Callan). 
 45. Schick, 195 U.S. at 78.  
 46. Id. (mentioning concerns such as “secret” or “indefinitely postponed” 
trials); see also Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 
1131, 1197–98 (1991). 
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trial itself must be by jury. 
By turning to well-known facts about the constitution’s 
ratification, Justice Harlan resolved the tension between the 
Constitution’s two criminal-trial provisions in a way that 
fully vindicated Article III’s peremptory command.  Harlan’s 
position, and rationale, expressed the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries’ understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment’s relation to Article III’s unwaivable jury-trial 
requirement.47 
B. Common Law Tradition 
To interpret the Constitution, late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century jurists turned not only to the document’s 
text but also to common law tradition.  The Constitution 
“must be read in light of the common law,”48  they said, 
because “its provisions are framed in the language of the 
English common law”49 and the common law “is the system 
from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are 
derived.” 50   Moreover, the common law’s “principles and 
history . . . were familiarly known to the framers.”51 
Gilded Age jurists thought common law principles and 
history unquestionably supported the no-waiver under-
standing of Article III’s peremptory text.  According to the 
early common law, defendants in criminal proceedings could 
plead guilty,52 demand trial by battle,53 choose a jury trial,54 
 47. See, e.g., Low, 169 F. at 91; Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 810–
11 (1st Cir. 1908).  Schick v. United States has dicta indicating that if there 
were a conflict between the two provisions, the Sixth Amendment would prevail 
in absence of common law considerations, but that observation had no influence 
given Callan’s determination that there was none.  Schick, 195 U.S. at 68–70; 
see also, e.g., Low, 169 F. at 91; Dickinson, 159 F. at 810–11. 
 48. Schick, 195 U.S. at 69. 
 49. Id. (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)). 
 50. Id. (quoting Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875)).  
 51. Id. (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)). 
 52. Though guilty pleas were an option at common law, English and 
American judges discouraged them at least until the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short 
History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 264–65 (1979). 
 53. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *346–49; United States v. Gibert, 25 F. 
Cas. 1287, 1305 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15–204). 
 54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *349–52; Erwin N. Griswold, The 
Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L. 
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or stand mute and be subject to peine forte  
et dure (which meant being crushed to death).55   By the late-
eighteenth century, peine and forte had been abolished, and 
defendants who stood mute were considered to have pled 
guilty.56  Even though trial by battle remained an option for 
defendants being prosecuted privately through the appeal of 
felony proceeding,57 the battle-option was not permitted for 
the vast majority of defendants who were prosecuted through 
proceedings commenced by indictment or information.58  Thus 
by the late-eighteenth century, almost all English criminal 
defendants were limited to three choices: pleading guilty, 
refusing to plead and being considered guilty, or trial by 
jury.59 
In short, the doctrine of the English common law was 
that jury trials for criminal defendants were not mandatory.  
Defendants could choose among modes of trial and had to 
elect to “put [themselves] upon the country.”60  At no time 
prior to the Constitution’s adoption did defendants charged 
with felonies have the option of waiving a jury and being tried 
REV. 655, 657 (1934) (emphasizing that “consent was the very basis of jury 
trial”).  Trial by battle was a common law mode of trial in which the truth of the 
matter was decided by armed conflict between the parties or their champions.  
It survived in England into the modern era.  See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *337–41. 
 55. Langbein, supra note 52, at 268.  The practice is detailed in Gibert.  
Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1304 (Story, J.). 
 56. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305; Griswold, supra note 54, at 657.  The statute 
ending peine and forte and entering a guilty plea for mute defendants was 
passed by Parliament in 1772.  Griswold, supra note 54, at 657 (citing Felony 
and Piracy Act, 1772, 12 Geo. 3, c. 20, § 1. (Eng.)). 
 57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *312–17, *346–47; William Riddell, 
Appeal of Death and Its Abolition, 24 MICH. L. REV. 786, 804–05 (1926).  The 
right to demand trial by battle in response to a civil proceeding begun by a writ 
of right also survived. See Riddell, supra, at 803.  Trial by battle in both actions 
was abolished by Parliament in 1819. Id. at 808; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 484, 494 n.11 (John McIntyre Cooley ed., 3d ed. 1884) (citing 
Appeal of Murder, etc., 1819, 59 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.)). 
 58. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305. 
 59. Parliament changed the law 1827 so that after that date defendants who 
refused to plead were considered to have plead not guilty.  Frank Grinnell, To 
What Extent Is the Right to Jury Trial Optional in Criminal Cases in 
Massachusetts, 8 MASS. L.Q. (No. 5) 7, 47 (1923); Griswold, supra note 54, at 
657 (citing Criminal Law Act, 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, § 2 (Eng.)). 
 60. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *344.  Blackstone explains the phrase by 
saying “the jury” is understood to be “country.”  Id. 
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by the bench.61 
The American colonies and the states in the early 
Republic generally followed English practice, with a few 
exceptions.  According to Gilded Age and early-twentieth-
century jurists, trial by battle was never introduced into 
America62 and refusals to plead were entered as a plea of “not 
guilty.”63  Peine and forte was not considered to have been 
introduced either,64 despite there having been a notorious 
instance of it during the Salem Witch hysteria.65  Although 
subsequent research has altered the picture somewhat, 66 
throughout the nineteenth- and early-twentieth- centuries, 
jurists were certain that according to colonial and Founding-
era criminal procedure, defendants charged with serious 
offenses had only two choices: plead guilty or be tried by a 
jury.  Bench trial predicated on defendant’s jury waiver was 
unknown in the early Republic.67 
 61. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1965); Dickinson v. United 
States, 159 F. 801, 805 (1st Cir. 1908) (discussing the constitutionality of a jury 
with less than twelve people); Susan C. Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench 
Trial for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 123, 123 (1982); Recent 
Decisions, Power of Defendant on Trial for Penitentiary Offense to Waive a Jury 
Trial, 30 COLUM. L. REV, 1063, 1063 (1930).  The jury waiver rule for 
misdemeanors is unclear.  Dickinson, 159 F. at 805.  The English procedure 
known as “submission” does not contradict my point as it was used exclusively 
for minor crimes.  See Towne, supra, at 136.  For a discussion of the English 
retreat from the no-waiver rule, see infra note 268. 
 62. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305. 
 63. Id.; see also Grinnell, supra note 59, at 47–48 (discussing colonial 
Massachusetts). 
 64. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305 (saying peine and forte was never introduced). 
 65. See ARTHUR MILLER, The Crucible: A Play in Four Acts, in COLLECTED 
PLAYS 1944–1961, at 343, 446–47 (2006) (Elizabeth Proctor describing Giles 
Cory’s refusal to plead and his death by “pressing”); Giles Corey, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giles_Corey (last updated Oct. 12, 2011) (saying 
that during the Salem witch trials Giles Corey refused to plead and was crushed 
to death with heavy stones).  In an introductory note, Miller vouches for the 
historical accuracy of “the fate of each character.”  MILLER, supra, at 345. 
 66. See infra text accompanying notes 324–96 (discussing subsequent 
research).  
 67. Towne, supra note 61, at 145.  Towne’s conclusion and my discussion 
must be read with the understanding that jury trial rights did not attach to 
petty offenses, see supra text accompanying notes 6–7, and that the 
petty/serious offense boundary was more generous than it is today, see 
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 922–65 (discussing petty offenses in 
eighteenth-century England and colonial America).  See also supra note 6. 
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C. Federal Practice and Supreme Court Precedent 
Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century jurists also 
found solid support for the no-waiver understanding of Article 
III’s jury trial mandate in the unbroken history of federal 
practice and Supreme Court precedent. 
As for early federal practice, the Supreme Court tells us 
that “[i]n no known federal criminal case in the period 
immediately following the adoption of the Constitution did a 
defendant claim that he had the right to insist upon a trial 
without a jury.”68  Nor did an eighteenth- or nineteenth- 
century Congress ever adopt or even consider a statute 
allowing defendants to ask for a bench trial.69 
In addition, the no-waiver rule reflects the way Supreme 
Court Justices read Article III, Section 2 throughout the 
nineteenth century.  Perhaps because the Constitution’s text 
and common-law tradition were so clear, there is almost no 
case law discussion of the issue before the last third of the 
nineteenth century.  The sole exception was remarks made by 
Justice Joseph Story in the course of a trial he presided over 
while riding circuits.  The proceeding,70 which involved the 
trial of the officers and crew of a Spanish schooner for piracy, 
was a major prosecution that implicated international 
affairs.71  When, after a fifteen-day trial,72 the jury found 
 68. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965). 
 69. Congress may well have thought that jury waiver was not permitted.  
Early federal legislation contemplated jury trial and made no provision for a 
bench trial for a defendant who preferred one.  The earliest congressional 
statute authorizing jury waiver and bench trial was passed in 1892.  It was 
limited to misdemeanors prosecuted in the Washington, D.C. Police Court.  See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 536, 26 Stat. 848, §§ 1–2 (1891); Lester Orfield, Trial by 
Jury in Federal Criminal Procedure, 1962 DUKE L. J. 29, 59.  At the very end of 
the nineteenth century, a few lower court judges began to express a contrary 
view.  Belt contains the earliest expressions.  See Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 33–34.  
See Orfield, supra, at 59–61 (discussing federal case law); infra text 
accompanying notes 155–69 (discussing the dissenting cases).  I am speaking 
only about interpretations of the federal constitution.  For early state court 
discussions of jury waiver as a matter of state constitutional law, see Cancemi 
v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 134–39 (1858); Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498, 500 (Mo. 
1847) 
 70. United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15–
204). 
 71. Id. at 1289 n.2.  The trial was celebrated enough for a stand-alone report 
to be published by CONG. STENOGRAPHER, A REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF PEDRO 
GIBERT (1834).  Gibert is remembered mainly for Justice Story’s ruling that the 
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause bars judges from granting a motion 
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some defendants guilty, their attorneys moved to arrest 
judgment and asked for a new trial.73  Among the attorneys’ 
objections was one faulting the proceedings because at the 
defendants’ arraignment, after they pled not guilty, “the clerk 
of the court . . . did not . . . ask the prisoners how they would 
be tried, so that they did not make the usual and common 
reply, ‘By God and the country.’ ” 74  Instead, upon motion of 
the district attorney, the presiding judge immediately 
assigned a trial date.75 
The gist of the objection was that the arraignment had 
skipped the traditional step of allowing the defendants the 
choice of determining how they would be tried.  At common 
law, where there were alternate modes of trial and painful 
consequences for choosing none of them, jury trials were 
improper without the defendant’s consent.76 
Justice Story easily rejected the objection.  Even though 
years ago in England it would have been well-taken, in 
America the objection was anachronistic and trivial.  “[I]n 
America,” he said, “the only trial since the first settlement of 
the country has always, in criminal cases, been by a jury; and 
could not be in any other manner.”77  Yet, because Gibert was 
a death penalty case, Story responded to this anachronistic 
objection with a learned and lengthy analysis78 in the course 
for a new trial “whether there be a verdict of acquittal or conviction.”  Gibert, 25 
F. Cas. at 1301.  Story’s view was never the dominant federal view and was 
eventually rejected by the Supreme Court.  See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 189 (1957) (discussing Gibert and its rejection); id. at 199–205 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 n.6 
(1965).  Story thought the remedy for error at trial was for the judge to follow 
English practice and ask the President to pardon the defendant or mitigate his 
sentence.  Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1297, 1302–03; see also Justin Curtis, The 
Meaning of Life (or Limb): An Originalist Proposal for Double Jeopardy Reform, 
41 U. RICH. L. REV. 991, 1016–19 (2007) (attributing to Gibert the view that 
Double Jeopardy applies only to capital offenses, which also did not win 
acceptance as federal law). 
 72. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1287. 
 73. Id. at 1294.  
 74. Id. at 1303–04. 
 75. Id. at 1304.  
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 52–56.  
 77. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305. 
 78. Id. at 1303.  Story’s response took over 2700 words; it fills three large 
pages of the reports.  Id. at 1303–06.  Perhaps Justice Story was also trying to 
show the fairness of the American legal system to foreigners who were going to 
be executed by it. 
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of which he asserted: 
The constitution has expressly declared, “that the trial of 
all crimes . . . shall be by jury.”  It is imperative upon the 
courts, and prisoners can be lawfully tried in no other 
manner. 
. . . . 
[W]hat is the reason, . . . at the common law, of asking the 
prisoner how he will be tried?  It is to ascertain whether 
he consents to a trial by jury . . . . I deem it a little short of 
an absurdity in the courts of the United States to call 
upon the prisoners, after they have pleaded guilty, to say 
how they will be tried, when the constitution and laws 
have peremptorily required the trial to be by jury.  
Suppose the prisoners had been asked, how they would be 
tried, and they had answered that they wished for no trial 
at all; must not the court have proceeded to try they upon 
the plea of not guilty?  Suppose they had answered that 
they wished to be tried by the court, could the court have 
done otherwise than order a trial by jury? . . . The 
constitution decides how he shall be tried, independent of 
any election on his part.79 
Admittedly, these remarks are dicta since they were not 
made in response to the question of whether a defendant in a 
federal criminal trial could waive his right to a jury trial and 
be tried solely by a judge.  Nonetheless, courts and scholars 
have read them to stand for the proposition that Justice Story 
“did not admit the possibility of waiver of jury trial.”80 
After the Civil War, commentary on jury waiver by 
Supreme Court Justices continued in the same vein as Justice 
Story’s in Gibert.  But now the remarks were made in 
 79. Id. at 1305–06.  Also relevant are Justice Story’s remarks concerning 
states which have constitutional provisions similar to Article III, Section 2: 
[I]t seems to me, that in all those states, where the constitution 
provides that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury, and the prisoner 
pleads not guilty, it is a mere mockery to ask him how he will be tried, 
for the constitution has already declared how it shall be. 
Id. at 1305. 
 80. Orfield, supra note 69, at 56; see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 
24, 31 (1965) (“[I]n . . . Gibert, . . . Story . . . indicated his view that the 
Constitution made trial by jury the only permissible method of trial.”); State v. 
Soper, 16 Me. 293, 297 (1839); Amar,  supra note 46, at 1196 & n.290 (citing 
Gibert); Appleman, supra note 2, at 441 (“Justice Story . . . contended that jury 
trial was the only permissible method of trial.”). 
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opinions in which the Justices spoke for the Supreme Court.  
In 1874, in developing analogies supporting one of the early 
unconstitutional conditions decisions81 protecting out-of-state 
corporations from state laws requiring that they waive their 
right to remove cases to federal court when sued by in-state 
plaintiffs, Justice Ward Hunt approvingly cited the leading 
state court anti-jury waiver case in the course of saying: 
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his 
substantial rights.  In a criminal case, he cannot, as was 
held in Cancemi’s Case, be tried in any other manner than 
by a jury of twelve men, although he consent in open court 
to be tried by a jury of eleven men.82 
Then in 1898, in Thompson v. Utah,83  Justice John 
Marshall Harlan asserted the no-waiver principle as a 
necessary support for the Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
Constitution’s jury trial mandate not only required twelve-
person juries but also prevented defendants from consenting 
to trial by a smaller jury.  In Thompson, the defendant  
was convicted of larceny in a Utah state court by a jury  
composed of eight men.84  Since Utah’s constitution expressly 
authorized eight-person juries in all but capital cases,85 the 
Utah Supreme Court easily upheld Thompson’s conviction 
under Utah law.86 
Throughout the nineteenth century, a valid conviction 
under state law normally would have ended the matter.87  
 81. Unconstitutional conditions arise when government conditions its 
extension of benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right.  For discussions of 
the doctrine, see, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 534–36, 946–50 (2d ed. 2002). 
 82. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (citation omitted).  
Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) was a leading state court expression of 
the no-waiver principle. 
 83. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). 
 84. Id. at 344. 
 85. See State v. Bates, 47 P. 78, 79 (Utah 1896) (quoting UTAH CONST. of 
1896 art. I, § 10). 
 86. State v. Thompson, 50 P. 409, 410 (Utah 1897) (relying on Bates, 47 P. 
at 79 (quoting UTAH CONST. of 1896 art. I, § 10)). 
 87. See, e.g., Corrinna Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking 
the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1361, 1369–71 (2004) (saying before incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
state criminal defendants had no recourse to federal court); Anthony O’Rourke, 
The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation, 45 GA. L. REV. 721, 727 
(2011) (saying prior to the 1920s it was not expected that the Supreme Court 
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The Thompson case, however, involved unique facts that 
allowed Thompson to raise an objection grounded in the 
federal Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause,88 which was one 
of the few rights provisions in the national charter that bound 
the states.  The facts were that Utah became a state in 1896 
and Thompson had committed his crime in 1895 when  
Utah was still a federal territory.89  At the time Thompson 
committed his crime, the federal Constitution’s jury 
provisions applied.  Unlike the Utah constitution, the federal 
Constitution’s jury trial guarantee meant “a jury constituted, 
as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor 
less.”90  Given that Thompson’s right to a twelve-person jury 
was a “substantial right,” a “right that was regarded, at the 
time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital for the 
protection of life and liberty,” any material change in it was 
impermissibly ex post facto.91 
When Thompson’s case reached the United States 
Supreme Court, Utah attempted to defend against application 
of the Ex Post Facto Clause by arguing that Thompson had 
waived his federal jury trial right by not “object[ing] until 
after verdict, to a trial jury composed of eight persons.”92  
Justice Harlan’s response to Utah’s waiver argument was 
divided into four parts.  First, he succinctly ruled that “[i]t is 
sufficient to say that it was not in the power of one accused of 
felony, by consent expressly given or by his silence, to 
authorize a jury of only eight persons to pass upon the 
question of his guilt.”93  Then Justice Harlan supported his 
ruling by quoting at length from Hopt v. Utah,94 a decade old 
case that said the defendant’s right to be present at his  
trial is not waivable.95  The Hopt Court’s view, which was 
would review state criminal trials and develop doctrine to aid state court 
defendants). 
 88. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post 
facto law . . . .”). 
 89. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 344. 
 90. Id. at 349.  
 91. Id. at 352.  The Utah court had rejected Thompson’s Ex Post Facto 
argument because it incorrectly regarded jury trial as a changeable procedural 
right.  Thompson, 50 P. at 410 (relying on Bates, 47 P. at 80–81). 
 92. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 353. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 574 (1884).  
 95. Id. at 578–79.  The specific facts of Hopt involved the defendant not 
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reasserted in Thompson, was that the pro-waiver argument: 
necessarily proceeds upon the ground that [the defendant] 
alone is concerned as to the mode by which he may be 
deprived of his life or liberty, and the chief object of the 
prosecution is to punish him for the crime charged . . . .  
[However] the public has an interest in his life and liberty 
. . . .  That which the law makes essential in proceedings 
involving the deprivation of life and liberty cannot be 
dispensed with or affected by the consent of the accused, 
much less by his mere failure, when on trial and in 
custody, to object to unauthorized methods.  The great end 
of punishment is not the expiation of atonement of the 
offense committed, but the prevention of future offenses of 
the same kind.  Such being the relation which the citizen 
holds to the public, and the object of punishment for public 
wrongs, . . . [i]f he be deprived of his life or liberty without 
being so present, such deprivation would be without that 
due process of law required by the constitution.96 
After this telling quote, Justice Harlan connected Hopt to 
Thompson by reasoning: “If one under trial for a felony . . . 
could not legally consent that the trial proceed in his absence, 
still less could he assent to be deprived of his liberty by a 
tribunal not authorized by law to determine his guilt.”97  And 
he concluded that “[i]n our opinion . . . the Constitution of the 
United States gave the accused . . . the right to be tried by a 
jury of twelve persons, and made it impossible to deprive him 
of his liberty except by the unanimous verdict of such a 
jury.”98 
being present at voir dire.  In the 1930s, Hopt was criticized as “dicta.”  Snyder 
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 118 n.2 (1934).  This was just after Thompson 
suffered a similar fate.  See infra text accompanying notes 201–07.  Hopt has 
since been substantially cut back.  Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: 
Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 129 & 
n.55 (1999).  The demise of the rule against jury waiver recounted in this paper 
was the leading edge of a general revision of thinking about waiver of the 
Constitution’s trial-related rights.  See id. at 125–32; infra text accompanying 
notes 105–51. 
 96. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 354 (quoting Hopt, 110 U.S. at 579). 
 97. Id. at 354–55. 
 98. Id. at 355.  In Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892), the Court ruled 
that where state law permitted jury waiver in state court prosecutions of state 
crimes there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  Thus in Thompson, the rule against jury waiver was only because of 
Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment. 
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Even though Justice Harlan’s opinion in Thompson dealt 
with the problem of consent to a jury composed of less than 
twelve persons, it was understood by lower court judges to 
stand as well for the proposition that federal bench trials 
were unconstitutional.99  All early-twentieth century federal 
appellate courts that addressed or commented on the issue 
took that stance.100  So did several trial and territorial 
courts.101  These cases elaborated on Thompson’s “the public 
is interested” rationale and discussed why defendants could 
waive some constitutional rights, such as their right to a jury 
in civil cases, and their right to object to a juror’s 
impartiality, but not others.  The future Supreme Court 
Justice Horace Lurton, while still a judge on the Sixth 
Circuit, touched on many of these issues when he wrote: 
The right to waive a right does not exist when the matter 
concerns the public as well as the individual . . . . Between 
the waiver of a jury in a civil case and its waiver in a trial 
for crime there are fundamental differences.  The one 
involves only property rights of the parties, rights over 
which they have dominion.  The other involves the liberty 
or life of the citizen.  This is a matter over which the 
accused has not dominion.  The state, the public, are 
concerned that neither shall be affected save by due 
process of law . . . . Undoubtedly the accused has a right to 
waive [also] everything which pertains to form and much 
which is of the structure of a trial.  But he may not waive 
that which concerns both himself and the public, nor any 
matter which involves fundamentally the jurisdiction of 
the court.  The jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a 
judgment or conviction for crime, when there has been a 
plea of not guilty, rests upon the foundation of a verdict by 
a jury.102 
 99. There was also some extension of the right.  See, e.g., Freeman v. United 
States, 227 F. 732, 759–60 (2d Cir. 1915) (whole trial must be heard by same 
judge and same twelve jurors).  One lower court went the opposite way but that 
court’s ruling pre-dated the Thompson decision.  See supra notes 30, 69 
(discussing Belt v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 25, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1894)).  
 100. Coates v. United States, 290 F. 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1923); Blair v. United 
States, 241 F. 217, 230 (9th Cir. 1917); Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 90 (6th 
Cir. 1909); Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 804–12 (1st Cir. 1908). 
 101. In re Virch, 5 Alaska 500, 504–05 (D.C. Alaska 1916); In re McQuown, 
91 P. 689, 689–90 (Okla Terr. 1907); see also Orfield, supra note 69, at 55–63 
(for a review of relevant cases before and after Thompson). 
 102. Low, 169 F. at 91–92. 
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To this, Judge William Putnam of the First Circuit added 
that the standard concern, in this formalist era, was that: 
We have been unable to . . . frame any satisfactory rule by 
which, if waivers [to the number of jurors] can be 
sustained, the jury may not be made to consist of 1 man 
instead of 12.  The legal mind involuntarily rejects a 
proposition that the jury might be so constituted 
constitutionally; and yet we are unable to determine at 
what point the weakening of the panel should stop unless 
it might by consent be reduced to a single individual . . . . 
except by the discretion of the judge; but, while, 
necessarily the discretion of the judge is often interposed 
in administering the civil law, and, to a certain extent the 
criminal law, it seems wholly inappropriate that it should 
be availed of in a matter of so grave a character as the 
construction and practical application of the Constitution 
of the United States.  We are not able to accept a 
proposition of that kind.103 
For late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century jurists 
the Constitution’s original meaning was clear.  Common law 
tradition and Supreme Court precedent complemented Article 
III, Section 2’s absolute text.  They all pointed to the 
conclusion that in federal court a jury waiver followed by 
bench trial could not be one of the defendant’s options.  The 
trial of all serious crimes had to be by jury.104 
 103. Dickinson, 159 F. at 809; see also WILLIAM ATWELL, A TREATISE ON 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE 47 (1st ed. 1911) (similar argument).  
Judge Putnam also found no contradiction in allowing civil jury waiver and 
waiver of juror impartiality by observing that it was permitted by the common 
law and, therefore, was a facet of the jury right the Constitution-makers placed 
in the federal Constitution.  Dickinson, 159 F. at 809. 
 104. I am speaking only of prosecutions that go to trial in the ordinary 
federal courts.  Military courts are not subject to Article III’s mandate.  
Although in the nineteenth century, the exception for military trials was 
coupled with a weak textual argument, the view that the all-inclusive language 
of Article III was not intended to change common law practices is currently the 
primary support for the holding that there is no jury trial right for defendants 
in trials conducted by the military.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4–5, 50 
(1957); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39–44 (1942) (relying on Revolutionary and 
Founding era practices); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866) (relying on 
inferences from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 
78 (1857) (relying on inferences from Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2; 
and the Eighth Amendment).  Even though there is no jury trial right in civil 
admiralty suits, see United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. 297 (1796) (no jury 
required in civil admiralty), there is a right to a jury in criminal admiralty 
prosecutions.  This is because English admiralty courts, since the reign of Henry 
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D. Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Theory: Jury Trial as 
a Public Right 
Although fully justified by constitutional text, history, 
and precedent, a criminal defendant’s inability to waive 
Article III’s jury trial mandate was more than a mere  
fact of American constitutional law brought about by  
some happenstance of legal history.105  It had widely-shared 
practical, political, and theoretical justifications.  As with any 
central feature of a legal regime, it was supported by a host of 
overlapping justifications, of greater or lesser strength, that 
interconnected to build a structure of thought stronger and 
more resilient than any one of the individual strands. 
While some of the justifications may not resonate with 
modern sensibilities, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the no-waiver rule had a host of practical and 
theoretical supports.  In colonial America, and perhaps in 
England as well, judges surely would not have been 
considered appropriate fact-finders and sole determiners of 
guilt or innocence.106   Because judicial tenure for “good 
behavior,” which was introduced into England in 1701, was 
never extended to the colonies,107 colonists tended to view 
their judges, who served “at the King’s pleasure,”  
with suspicion as agents of a remote government.108  In this 
environment, one can easily imagine the colonists’ distrust of 
the colonial judiciary being transferred over to the judges of 
the new and distant national government and even to the 
VIII, involved juries in their criminal cases.  Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 
459–60 (1847) (contrasting English practice in civil and criminal admiralty); 
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 44 (2d ed. 
1975).  Significantly, the early American cases also rely on Article III, Section 
2’s absolute language.  Waring, 46 U.S. at 481; United States v. New Bedford 
Bridge, 27 F. Cas. 91, 110 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 15–867). 
 105. There was a vogue in the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries to 
trace facets of current law to anachronistic facets of medieval or ancient law.  
The rule against jury waiver was subject to this analysis by its opponents.  See 
Dickinson, 159 F. at 820–21 (Aldrich, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying 
notes 305–12. 
 106. In addition, before the “lawyerization” of the criminal trial in the early-
nineteenth century, judges may not have been seen as available to serve as fact-
finder due to their role as advisor to the defendant and superintendent of the 
“altercation” between the defendant, victim, and witnesses.  Langbein, supra 
note 52, at 264. 
 107. Siegel, supra note 8, at 699 n.241. 
 108. Langbein, supra note 52, at 269 (“crown hirelings”). 
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judges of their own state.  As John Langbein has written, 
especially “[i]n America, where the judiciary’s association 
with the excesses of English colonial administration had led 
the framers to make jury trial a constitutional right, bench 
trial was all the harder to envision.”109  In addition, in a legal 
system in which every felony was a capital crime, judges 
might themselves wish to avoid being the sole person to 
determine whether defendants lived or died.110 
Finally, according to recent scholarship on the history of 
waiver of trial-related constitutional rights, the foundation of 
the Constitution’s unwaivable jury trial mandate follows from 
the fact that early America was a society in which rights  
typically were inalienable.111  Although communitarian and 
individualistic norms were intermixed, early America still 
gave greater prominence to communitarian premises in its 
public philosophy. 112   It was also a more paternalistic 
society.113  In this society, rights tended to be conceived not as 
private possessions but as “public goods” valorized for 
protecting and promoting the public’s interest.114 
Specifically with regard to jury trial, the public’s interest 
was twofold.  It was a means to protect defendants from 
overreaching officials,115 as well as an instrument of popular 
government serving a variety of related goals. 116   Most 
specifically, as Jason Mazzone writes, “in the early years of 
the Republic, jurors looked much more like judges than they 
 109. Id. (describing why England and America developed an adversary 
criminal process rather than one that was bench-centered). 
 110. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 11; Langbein, supra note 52, at 270 (making 
the point in relation to politically controversial cases).  
 111. King, supra note 95, at 119–21; Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 801, 850–54 (2003). 
 112. See, e.g., DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY 1–5, 37–
40, 169–71 (2007) (tracing differing property confiscation regimes during the 
Revolution and the Civil War to shift from Republican to Liberal political 
philosophy); Stephen A. Siegel, The Marshall Court and Republicanism, 67 TEX. 
L. REV., 903, 915–18 (1989) (book review) (discussing Republicanism). 
 113. King, supra note 95, at 121 (relating the “demise of paternalism” as a 
barrier to waiver to the “provision of defense counsel”). 
 114. See id. at 120–21; Mazzone, supra note 111, at 850–55. 
 115. Appleman, supra note 2, at 408; Mazzone, supra note 111, at 850–51. 
 116. AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 120–23 (1997); Appleman, supra note 2, at 408–39; Mazzone, supra 
note 111, at 851–52 (discussing jury trial and the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
against self-incrimination as public rights); see also King, supra note 95, at 126–
29 (discussing the Sixth Amendment right of “presence” as a public right). 
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do today.  Instead of simply deciding well-defined issues of 
fact, early juries also interpreted and applied the law.”117 
Thus through jury service, the local community 
effectively impressed its mores and norms into the criminal 
law.118 
If jury service enabled the local community to affect the 
law, it also allowed the law to affect the local community.  
Jury service was of public importance, in part, because it 
educated the populace.  As stated in an article in the 
Washington Law Reporter in 1884, the jury was “a public 
school of the highest possible order for the training of  
good citizens.”119   These words were part of a stream of 
commentary on the value of jury service running from the 
Founding era Letters From A Federal Farmer,120 to Alexis de 
Tocqueville in the nineteenth century121 and, most recently, to 
Akhil Amar.122 
In addition, jury service was valued as “the democratic 
branch of the judiciary power.”123  At the Founding, a widely-
shared political principle was that “the people” should 
participate directly in every branch of government.  Indeed, 
both Thomas Jefferson and John Mercer, an anti-Federalist 
member of the Constitutional Convention, were of the view 
that popular participation in the judicial branch was “more 
 117. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 851. 
 118. AMAR, supra note 116, at 122–23 (discussing the role of “normative 
judgment” involved in jury service); Appleman, supra note 2, at 408–09 (saying 
jury service enabled the local community effectively “to both create and control  
. . . the substantive law”).  
 119. Perkins, supra note 33, at 25 n.33 (quoting Waiver of Juries in Criminal 
Cases, 12 WASH. L. REP. 456, 458 (1884) (reprinting an article by W.R. in the 
Chicago Legal News)). 
 120. AMAR, supra note 116, at 122 (quoting the Letters’ view that “[The 
people’s] situation, as jurors and representatives, enables them to acquire 
information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the society; and to 
come forward, in turn, as the centinels and guardians of each other”). 
 121. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 851 (“The jury is both the most effective 
way of establishing the people’s rule and the most efficient way of teaching 
them how to rule.” (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
276 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1835))). 
 122.  AMAR, supra note 116, at 122 (“Through jury service, citizens would 
learn their rights and duties, and actively participate in the governance of 
society.”). 
 123. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 851 (quoting Essays by a Farmer (pt. 4), 
MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
36, 38 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981)). 
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necessary than representatives in the legislature.”124  It was 
this sentiment that led Alexander Hamilton to famously say 
that although the “friends and adversaries” of the 
Constitution “concur . . . in the value they set upon the trial 
by jury,” the friends “regard it as a valuable safeguard to 
liberty,” while the adversaries “represent it as the very 
palladium of free government.”125 
Shaped by these precepts, nineteenth-century lawyers, 
judges, and commentators articulated two legal theories to 
explain why criminal defendants could not waive a jury trial.  
These two theories were so much a part of nineteenth century 
thinking about juries that Supreme Court Justices, in the 
already quoted string of precedent on the no-waiver principle, 
stated them casually as the relevant ground norms.126 
One theory, known as the “public interest” or “public 
rights” theory, simply affirmed that “in criminal cases . . . 
there are more than personal interests involved[.] . . . [T]he 
rights and interests of the public are also concerned.  Hence, 
the right of waiver is denied . . . .”127  As explained at greater 
length by a federal appellate court judge: 
The right to waive a right does not exist when the matter 
concerns the public as well as the individual . . . . [A] trial 
for crime . . . involves the liberty or life of the citizen.  This 
is a matter over which the accused has not dominion.  The 
state, the public, are concerned that neither shall be 
affected save by due process of law.128 
 124. AMAR, supra note 116, at 121 (quoting Essays by a Farmer, supra note 
123); id. at 121 (quoting from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1789 voicing 
the same sentiment).  John Mercer is the likely author of the anonymously 
published Essays by a Farmer.  See Walter Nicgorski, The Anti-Federalists: 
Collected and Interpreted, 46 REV. POL. 113, 116 (1984).  
 125. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 850 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 
467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 31, 82, 98. 
 127. JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 157 (1877).  
 128. Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 91–92 (6th Cir. 1909); see also Cancemi 
v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 137 (1858) (“Criminal prosecutions involve public wrongs 
. . . which affect the whole community, considered as a community, in its social 
and aggregate capacity”) (internal quotations omitted); W. F. Elliott, Waiver of 
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 6 CRIM. L. MAG. 182, 182–83, 189–90 
(1885) (saying, inter alia, “[t]he public as well as the individual have an interest 
in every criminal trial”); Waiver of Juries, supra note 119, at 457 (reprinting 
article from the Chicago Legal News) (jury is “a political institution . . . the 
strict maintenance of which society . . . has an interest which far transcends the 
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The other theory, known as the “jurisdiction” theory, asserted 
that when a constitution, whether federal or state, declared a 
jury trial right it established the jury as part of the frame of 
government.  As stated in the leading antebellum precedent, 
“when issue is joined upon an indictment, the trial must be by 
the tribunal and in the mode which the constitution and laws 
provide, without any essential change.  The public officer 
prosecuting for the people has no authority to consent to  
such a change, nor has the defendant.”129  A post-bellum case 
rendered the thought even more simply when it said: the 
defendant “has no power to consent to the creation of a new 
tribunal, unknown to the law, to try his offense.”130  So did 
Justice Harlan when, dissenting from the case that 
established the petty offense exception, he insisted that, 
“[u]nder the express words of [the] Constitution . . . [t]he 
court and the jury, not separately, but together, constitute the 
appointed tribunal which alone, under the law, can try the 
question of crime, the commission of which by the accused is 
put in issue by a plea of not guilty.”131  In other words, when 
the Constitution declared in Article III that “the trial of all 
crimes . . . shall be by jury,”132 it ordained that the only 
tribunal with lawful power to try a person accused of crime 
had to be composed of an Article III judge and a common law 
jury. 
In truth, the “public interest” and “jurisdiction” theories 
expressed correlative understandings of the federal and state 
constitutions’ jury trial mandates.133  By either theory, jury 
in importance that of the individual whose rights may come before it”). 
 129. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138. 
 130. Territory of Montana v. Ah Wah, 1 P. 732, 734 (Mont. 1881); see also 
Territory of New Mexico v. Ortiz, 42 P. 87, 88 (N.M. 1895) (defendant “must be 
given trial before a tribunal known to the law—one having the power to declare 
his guilt”); Metzner v. State, 157 S.W. 69, 70 (Tenn. 1913) (saying trial by jury 
“is a matter of jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and cannot be 
conferred by consent”); PROFFATT, supra note 127, at 155 (saying “the jury is a 
part of the administration of law, as much inherent to the court as any part of 
the tribunal” and “to dispense with a jury . . . was in reality constituting 
another tribunal than that established by law”).  In Low, the court said that 
“[t]he jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a judgment or conviction for crime, 
when there has been a plea of not guilty, rests upon verdict by a jury.”  Low, 169 
F. at 92.  
 131. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 133. Consider also how easily cases and commentators ran the two theories 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC 3/22/2012  2:22:07 PM 
400 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
trial was a right that governments could not deny and 
defendants could not waive.  Jury trial protected the people 
as well as the defendant. 
Like all theories, the “public rights” and “jurisdiction” 
theories had weaknesses and inconsistencies.134  Neverthe-
less, as is usual with widely-accepted theories, contem-
poraries thought the theories’ problems had sufficient 
answers.  For example, in establishing the no-waiver rule for 
criminal trials, judges and commentators had to account for 
the fact that civil juries could be waived.135  The response 
stated in “public interest” theory terms was: civil suits involve 
property rights that are solely the concern of the parties and 
therefore properly under their dominion.136  After the no-
waiver rule was established, its proponents needed to explain 
why some criminal trial rights, such as the rights of personal 
presence,137 confrontation,138 and a speedy trial,139 could be 
together.  See, e.g., Low, 169 F. at 91–92; Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 31–32; Elliott, 
supra note 128, at 189 (speaking of “where the matter is jurisdictional and 
affects the public”). 
 134. THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66–76 (3d ed. 
1996) (discussing various theories in astronomy, chemistry, and physics); 
Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 176 
(2009) (discussing the phenomenon of people sticking to legal theories despite 
their weaknesses).   
 135. Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. 275, 281–83 (1871) (upholding a statute 
authorizing elective bench trials in civil suits and reviewing older precedents 
allowing waiver of civil juries); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 243–45 
(1819); Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 136 (1858) (discussing waiver of civil 
jury). 
 136. Schick, 195 U.S. at 96 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing criminal 
from civil jury waiver by saying that criminal trials involve “things of more 
consequence to the public than property, the value of which is to be measured in 
money”); Low, 169 F. at 92 (waiver of civil jury allowed because they “involve[] 
only property rights . . . over which [the parties] have dominion”); Belt, 4 App. 
D.C. at 32 (civil jury waivable because civil cases involve private rights); 
Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 136; THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF 
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 181 (1868) (waiver of constitutional rights 
are permissible when they are “designed for the protection solely of the property 
rights of the person”); Waiver of Juries, supra note 119, at 456–58.  Civil jury 
waiver was also justified by history as it was permitted at common law.  
Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 807 (1st Cir. 1908). 
 137. King, supra note 95, at 127–29 (discussing the judicial retreat on 
protecting the defendant’s right to be present at his trial); Elliott, supra note 
128, at 185–86. 
 138. See Elliott, supra note 128, at 186–88 (discussing waiver of 
confrontation). 
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waived while the jury itself could not. 140   Drawing from 
jurisdiction theory, the response was that although 
defendants could waive trial related rights that were “merely 
. . . formal”141 or “incidental,”142 they could not waive any that 
were “fundamental”143 or “essential.”144 
Perhaps the most obvious inconsistency for both theories 
was that any defendant effectively waived a jury trial by 
pleading  guilty.145   From the “public rights” theory came the 
answer that along with the defendant’s admission “the 
preliminary investigation of a grand jury . . . . is sup- 
posed to be a sufficient safeguard to the public interest.”146  
Unsurprisingly, the “jurisdiction” theory reached the same 
result by pointing out that, “When the accused pleads guilty 
before a lawful tribunal he admits every material fact . . . and 
there is no issue to be tried; no facts are to be found; no trial 
occurs.  After such a plea nothing remains to be done except 
that the court shall pronounce judgment . . . .”147  As Justice 
 139. Territory of New Mexico v. Ortiz, 42 P. 87, 88 (N.M. 1895) 
(distinguishing speedy trial waiver from jury waiver because the latter affects 
jurisdiction); Perkins, supra note 33, at 23 (mentioning waiver of “speedy trial 
by asking for a continuance”). 
 140. See generally Perkins, supra note 33, at 23–24 (list of waivable trial 
related rights). 
 141. Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 32; see also Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137–38 (consent 
permitted to “mere formal proceedings”). 
 142. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (waiver permitted 
when trial-related right provides only an “incidental benefit” to the defendant); 
see also Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 816 (1st Cir. 1908) (Aldrich, J., 
dissenting) (contrasting waiving the “incidental” with the “fundamental”). 
 143. Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 32; see also Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 92 (6th 
Cir. 1909) (no waiver of “any matter which involves fundamentally the 
jurisdiction of the court”); Dickinson, 159 F. at 816 (Aldrich, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing that “fundamental” aspects of the jury right cannot be waived). 
 144. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138 (no “essential change”); see also Schick v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (no change in any 
“essential rule”); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (quoted supra text 
accompanying note 96). 
 145. It should be noted that guilty pleas were not so frequent in the 
nineteenth century so the inconsistency was not as noted.  Guilty pleas, and 
awareness of the problem, dramatically increase in the twentieth century with 
the rise of plea bargaining.  See Alschuler, supra note 52, at 5–6; John H. 
Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal 
Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 120 (1992); Langbein, supra note 
52, at 268–70. 
 146. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138. 
 147. Schick, 195 U.S. at 82 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also West v. 
Gammon, 98 F. 426, 428–29 (6th Cir. 1899) (holding that guilty pleas do not 
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Harlan concluded, if due to a guilty plea there is no trial, 
there cannot be a violation of the Constitution’s requirement 
that “the trial of a crime shall be by jury.”148 
Legal theories never are airtight.  Social, political and 
cultural factors, along with the theories’ basic logic, 
determine whether they are successful.  In its consideration 
of waiver of trial-related rights, jurisprudence has moved 
beyond the “public interest” and “jurisdiction” theories, at 
least as originally stated.149  Nevertheless, throughout the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they were widely 
accepted and are readily apparent in the case law and 
treatises.  Although in the last third of the nineteenth 
century a few state courts and commentators began to 
criticize and even reject them,150 in 1900, and up through the 
1920s, 151  the “public interest” and “jurisdiction” theories 
provided the standard grounding for the criminal defendant’s 
inability to choose a bench trial when prosecuted for a serious 
offense. 
II. DISSENTING VOICES IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
For late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century jurists, 
the Constitution’s text, common law tradition, Supreme Court 
precedent, and constitutional theory all clearly supported the 
no-waiver understanding of Article III, Section 2’s jury trial 
requirement.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Thompson v. 
Utah152 in 1898 was taken as settling the question.153 
violate the jury trial mandate because it obviates the need for a jury trial); Note, 
Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 21 HARV. L. REV., 212, 213 (1908). 
 148. Schick, 195 U.S. at 82. 
 149. See infra text accompanying note 292–302 (discussing the theories’ 
rejection); Appleman, supra note 2, at 446 (arguing for a revival of differently 
configured public interest theory); King, supra note 95, at 725; Mazzone, supra 
note 111, at 851. 
 150. See In re Staff, 23 N.W. 587 (Wis. 1885); State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 
(1878); infra notes 267–68. 
 151. See infra text accompanying notes 264–65. 
 152. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 343 (1898). 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03 (discussing lower court 
precedent after Thompson).  The 1904 Supreme Court ruling that defendants 
had no right to a jury trial when prosecuted for “petty” offenses, a decision 
taken over Justice Harlan’s vigorous dissent, was not understood as 
undercutting the no-waiver rule for “serious” crime.  See Schick, 195 U.S. at 72.  
English common law and colonial, early state and federal practice all recognized 
the exception.  See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, passim.  
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During the three decades following the Thompson 
decision there were only two dissenting voices in the federal 
judiciary. 154   One was Frederick Brown, who sat on the 
District Court for the Territory of Alaska.155  Aware of the 
difficulty of “procuring a jury of twelve . . . in isolated places,” 
and thinking that defendants wished to avoid the consequent 
delay, Judge Brown suggested enlarging the petty offense 
exception to embrace all misdemeanors.156  Quoting Supreme 
Court precedent which said “[t]he law is a progressive 
science,”157 Brown argued that “[t]he determination of [a jury 
waiver] case requires the exercise of ‘practical common sense,’ 
the ‘rule of reason,’ freed from the trammels of the old 
common-law distinctions between the degrees of crimes as 
characterized hundreds of years ago under vastly different 
conditions.”158 
The other dissenting voice was Edgar Aldrich, a district 
court judge who wrote a long dissent while sitting on the 
circuit court panel that decided Dickinson v. United States.159  
 154. See 3 LESTER B. ORFIELD, ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE 
FEDERAL RULES 43–46 (2d ed. 1986); Orfield, supra note 69, at 61–63 
(discussing the cases decided between Schick and Patton).  I do not consider 
Territory v. Soga decided by the Hawaiian Territory Court as contrary to my 
claim because I read that case to have determined the offense a petty crime. 
Territory v. Soga, 20 Haw. 71, 92–93 (1910) (saying the offense at bar was 
neither a felony nor infamous).  Nor do I consider Queenan v. Oklahoma as 
departing from the rule of Thompson because that case involved a waiver of 
juror qualifications.  See Queenan v. Oklahoma, 190 U.S. 548, 551 (1903).  Belt 
v. United States does not conflict with my claim because, although Belt upheld 
jury waiver for misdemeanors, it was decided before Thompson.  See Belt v. 
United States, 4 App. D.C. 25, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1894).  Thompson implicitly 
overruled Belt.  See Thompson, 170 U.S. 343. 
 155. But see In re Virch, 5 Alaska 500 (D.C. Alaska 1916) (another Alaskan 
territorial judge construing the petty offense exception narrowly).  I derive 
Judge Brown’s first name from Michael Schwaiger’s Salmon, Sage-Brush, and 
Safaris: Alaska’s Territorial Judicial System and the Adventures of the Floating 
Court.  Michael Schwaiger, Salmon, Sage-Brush, and Safaris: Alaska’s 
Territorial Judicial System and the Adventures of the Floating Court, 1901–
1915, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 97, 98, 99 (2009).  Although I am treating Judge 
Brown as a member of the federal judiciary, the point should be made that he 
was not an Article III judge and served at the pleasure of the President.  Id. at 
101 n.15. 
 156. Ex parte Dunlap, 5 Alaska 521, 523–26 (D. Alaska 1916). 
 157. Id. at 525 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385 (1898)). 
 158. Id. at 527.  
 159. Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 812–24 (1st Cir. 1908) (Aldrich, 
J., dissenting).  
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Dickinson involved an appeal from a three-month long trial of 
two bank cashiers charged with misappropriating funds.160  
During the trial two jurors were discharged, one for sickness 
and the other because of a death in his family.161  Each time a 
juror was dismissed, the defendants consented in writing  
to the trial’s continuation.162   After his conviction on a 
misdemeanor count for aiding and abetting the other cashier, 
Dickinson demanded a new trial on the ground that the 
verdict was not rendered “by a jury of twelve jurors, as 
required by the Constitution.”163 
Aldrich thought that the facts of Dickinson made  
an especially “strong” case for allowing waiver.164  But he 
defended the propriety of jury waiver more generally through 
an analysis that, like Judge Brown’s, broke with the formalist 
jurisprudence of his colleagues.165  Aldrich was attracted to 
the progressive jurisprudence of “Mr. Justice Holmes,” 
according to which “constitutional rights . . . are matters of 
degree, and constitutional provisions are not to be pushed to a 
logical extreme, but must be taken to permit the infliction  
of some fractional and relatively small losses.”166  By this 
balancing-of-interests approach to constitutional analysis: 
The aim of the constitutional safeguards in question is a 
full, fair, and public trial, and one which shall reasonably 
and in all substantial ways safeguard the interests of the 
state and the life and liberty of accused parties.  Whether 
the idea is expressed in words or not, as is done in some of 
the bills of rights and constitutions, a free and fair trial 
only means a trial as free and fair as the lot of humanity 
will admit.167 
 
 160. Id. at 801–02 (majority opinion); id. at 812 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).  
 161. Id. at 812 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).  
 162. Id. at 804 (majority opinion).  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 813.  Among the facts is the length of the trial, that the jury 
started off properly composed, that the charge was a misdemeanor, and that the 
defendant gave his explicit written consent. 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 103 (quoting the Dickinson majority).  
Aldrich also broke with his colleagues’ historical assumptions.  See Dickinson, 
159 F. at 814–15 (questioning the no-waiver rule’s historical basis). 
 166. Dickinson, 159 F. at 813 (Aldrich, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice 
Holmes’s remark).  
 167. Id. 
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The dissenting views of Judges Brown and Aldrich may 
have been prescient,168 but throughout the 1910s and 1920s 
they had traction neither with their fellow judges, nor with 
treatise writers whose specialty was federal criminal 
procedure.  Federal criminal procedure treatises published 
during those decades agreed that “[o]ne accused of an 
infamous crime or felony cannot waive a trial by jury . . . even 
though the United States and the defendant consent 
thereto.”169  No treatise noticed Judge Brown’s opinion and 
the only treatise to mention Judge Aldrich’s dissent did so to 
criticize it.170  Throughout the 1920s, the dominant opinion 
remained as it had been in 1900: Article III mandated an 
unwaivable requirement that “the trial of all crimes . . . be by 
jury.”171 
III. THE OVERTHROW OF ARTICLE III’S JURY TRIAL MANDATE 
AND THE NO-WAIVER RULE IN 1930 
A. The Patton Decision 
From the Founding through the 1920s, constitutional 
text, precedent, and history were thought to support the rule 
that “in all but petty offenses jury trial was a constitutional 
imperative.”172  Yet, in 1930, this 140-year-old understanding 
was swept away in Patton v. United States.173  Patton involved 
 168. See infra text accompanying notes 200–303 (discussing the no-waiver 
rule’s demise).  
 169. 1 ELIJAH ZOLINE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 210 (1921); 
see also ATWELL, supra note 2, at 79–80; JOHN BRYNE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 143 (1916).  Atwell’s treatise had a first and second edition 
published in 1911 and 1916 respectively that stated the same rule. 
 170. ATWELL, supra note 2, at 79–80.  Atwell not only supported the no-
waiver rule, he considered guilty pleas in felony cases a violation of the right to 
jury trial.  Id. at 26–27.  Atwell’s strong support of jury trial was premised on 
his view that “[n]o judge, however learned, no set of judges, however impartial 
can approximate the justice that is found and dispensed by the layman juror.”  
Id. at 78.  Atwell’s praise, which might have been more typical in the nineteenth 
century, was anachronistic in his day.  By the 1920s, the institution of jury trial 
was under substantial attack.  See infra text accompanying notes 269–303. 
 171. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 172. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 32 (1965); see also Schick v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 65, 95–96 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 173. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 276 (1930).  Patton came to the 
Court as a certified question from the Eighth Circuit.  Id. at 287.  In the 
certification opinion, the appellate judges did not claim there was any circuit 
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a felony trial that lasted for seven days.174  On the sixth day a 
juror was excused for “severe illness.”175  Rather than accept a 
mistrial, both the prosecution and defense consented to 
“waive all objections” and agreed to finish the trial with the 
eleven remaining jurors.176   After their conviction, the 
defendants appealed, arguing they “had no power to waive 
their constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve 
persons.”177 
Thus the issue in Patton, if narrowly defined, was the 
constitutionality of consent to continuing a trial that began 
with a properly formed jury when a juror is excused for good 
cause during the trial.178  When, a dozen years later, Patton 
was extended to a case involving complete jury waiver 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented on the ground 
that “there is a considerable practical difference between trial 
by eleven jurors, the situation in Patton . . . and trial to the 
court, and practicality is a sturdy guide to the preservation of 
Constitutional guarantees.”179  The majority, however, treated 
conflict regarding the jury-waiver rule.  Rather, the judges said they were “in 
doubt as to the law” because of defendants’ abilities to waive other 
constitutional rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, confrontation, and 
assistance of counsel.  Patton v. United States, 30 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 
1929).  That the Eighth Circuit could cite no conflicting case law indicates the 
circuit was forcing the issue and suggests that the Supreme Court, in accepting 
the question, may well have been reaching for it.  Certification is generally a 
disfavored procedure for presenting issues to the Supreme Court.  See EUGENE 
GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 9.1 at 597 (9th ed. 2007).  
Patton arose during what was perhaps the only decade when it was somewhat 
popular.  Id. § 9.1, at 596–97 (giving statistics on certification petitions and 
grants); James Moore & Allan Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification 
in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 n.99 (1949). 
 174. Patton, 281 U.S. at 286.  The charge, conspiracy to bribe a prohibition 
agent, was the most minor grade of felony as it was punishable by one year in 
prison.  See id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 286–87.  Thus, the case was similar to Dickinson v. United States.  
See Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 801 (1st Cir. 1908) (discussed supra 
text accompanying notes 159–67, except that it involved a felony rather than a 
misdemeanor). 
 177. Patton, 281 U.S. at 287. 
 178. Id.  Appellate court precedent, albeit with a divided panel, permitted 
such a trial to continue with a replacement juror.  Grove v. United States, 3 
F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1925).  In Grove, the transcript of prior testimony was read to 
the reconstituted jury, and the witnesses vouched to their former testimony.  
The main issue was whether there was a confrontation clause violation.  Id. at 
965. 
 179. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 286 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
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Patton as decisive and brushed the dissenters’ view aside.180 
Whatever the merits of Patton’s extension to complete 
rather than partial jury waiver, Patton surely announced a 
paradigm shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
criminal jury-trial-waiver issue and contains its fullest 
explication.181   Patton also is the watershed case for the 
analysis of waiver of criminal trial-related rights in 
general.182 
Patton was written by Justice George Sutherland, a 
conservative Justice who believed the Court’s proper role was 
to discover, articulate, and apply the principles of Anglo-
American government that the Founding generation 
embedded in the Constitution when they wrote and adopted 
it.183  Sutherland’s dissent in the depression-era mortgage 
moratorium case, Home Building & Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell,184 is an iconic statement of judicial commitment  
to an unchanging constitution.185  In that dissent, Justice 
Sutherland insisted that “[a] provision of the Constitution . . . 
does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different 
dissenting); see also id. at 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 180. Adams, 317 U.S. at 277–78. 
 181. The circuit courts immediately cited Patton as deciding the complete 
waiver issue.  See Ferracane v. United States, 47 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1931) 
(“Since the Supreme Court decision in Patton . . . there is no longer any question 
of the right to waive”).  Adams came to the Supreme Court because it involved 
the extreme situation of a jury waiver by a defendant who was not a lawyer and 
who was representing himself.  See Adams, 317 U.S. at 270–71.  He had, 
however, acted as a lawyer in various suits against the New York Stock 
Exchange, Better Business Bureau, and others.  Id.  These facts might make 
someone question the defendant’s mental stability rather than deem him legally 
astute.  Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in Adams succinctly 
reiterates the “principle” of Patton and finds it decisive.  Id. at 275. 
 182. See King, supra note 95, at 125–30 (shifts in doctrine regarding the 
defendant’s right to jury waiver, presence, and limitations periods); Mazzone, 
supra note 111, at 849–55 (using jury waiver to explain and date the shift to a 
view that criminal-trial-related rights are “individualistic”).  
 183. G. Edward White, The “Constitutional Revolution” as a Crisis in 
Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 884–99 (1997).  White makes the point that 
Justice Sutherland sought fidelity to the Constitution’s fixed “meta-principles.”  
Id. at 891 n.109. 
 184. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 185. James Ely, Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 371, 390 (2010); Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 639, 665–67 (2009); Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 706–07 (2005); White, supra note 183, at 884–86. 
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thing at another time.”186  In his view: 
The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of 
the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people 
who adopted it.  The necessities which gave rise to the 
provision, the controversies which preceded, as well as the 
conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, are 
matters to be considered to enable us to arrive at a correct 
result.  The history of the times, the state of things 
existing when the provision was framed and adopted 
should be looked to in order to ascertain the mischief and 
the remedy.  As nearly as possible we should place 
ourselves in the condition of those who framed and 
adopted it.  And, if the meaning be at all doubtful, the 
doubt should be resolved, wherever reasonably possible to 
do so, in a way to forward the evident purpose with which 
the provision was adopted.187 
Justice Sutherland’s originalism did not preclude all 
constitutional adaptation.  Constitutional “provisions . . .  
are pliable,” he believed, “in the sense that in appro- 
priate cases they have the capacity of bringing within  
their grasp every new condition which falls with  
their meaning.”188  Nonetheless, outside of an Article V 
amendment,189 constitutional adaptivity was limited by the 
“meaning/application” dichotomy.190  For Sutherland, the 
 186. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
449–53 (quoting other Justices and leading treatise writers). 
 187. Id. at 453 (citations omitted). 
 188. Id. at 451.  Justice Sutherland’s most famous discussion of the 
meaning/application distinction is the landmark case upholding the 
constitutionality of zoning, where he said: 
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the 
scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and 
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of 
their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be 
otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to 
the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, 
statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new 
conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of 
course, must fall. 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); see also White, 
supra note 183, at 897–98 (explicating Justice Sutherland’s views on 
constitutional change). 
 189. U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the process for amending the 
Constitution’s text). 
 190. By the “meaning/application” dichotomy I mean Justice Sutherland’s 
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Constitution’s “meaning is changeless; it is only [its] 
application which is extensible.”191 
Despite his jurisprudence, it was Justice Sutherland who 
gave an entirely new meaning to Article III’s jury clause.  His 
Patton opinion illuminates how, even for a dedicated 
opponent of a “living Constitution,” evolving principles of 
constitutional policy may nevertheless alter the meaning of 
concrete and determinate constitutional text. 
Justice Sutherland’s Patton opinion began with a 
reminder that was entirely consistent with common law 
tradition and Supreme Court precedent: that the three 
“essential elements” of a common law (and, therefore, 
constitutional) jury trial were 1) twelve men, 2) supervised 
and instructed by a judge, who 3) reach a unanimous 
verdict.192  Also, consistent with precedent and its formalist 
logic, Sutherland stated that if there is any variation in the 
number of jurors “it ceases to be [a constitutional] jury.”193  
Subtracting one juror or eleven jurors was different only in 
the size of the “infraction”194 and “[i]t is not our province . . . 
[to] ignore the violation, if, in our opinion, it is not, relatively, 
as bad as it might have been.”195  Consistent with the views of 
Justices throughout the nineteenth century, Sutherland 
refused to separate the issue of partial from full waiver.  
Although Patton involved a verdict rendered by an eleven-
person jury, Sutherland addressed the case as necessarily 
implicating the constitutionality of “complete waiver” 
followed by a bench trial.196 
In other words, in Patton, Justice Sutherland understood 
the issue of a short jury exactly as Justices had throughout 
contrast between the principles embedded in constitutional provisions, which 
are fixed and unchanging, and outcome of their use in discrete cases, which may 
change as the facts or societal context they govern changes.  See White, supra 
note 183, at 874–79, 884–86 (discussing the views of Justice Sutherland and 
Solicitor-General James Beck). 
 191. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 192. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); see also id. at 289 
(speaking of the “requisites” of jury trial). 
 193. Id. at 292; see also id. at 288–89 (quoting Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 
343 (1898), discussed supra text accompanying notes 83–98). 
 194. Id. at 292.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 290.  
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the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.197  He phrased 
the “crucial inquiry” as they had: was “the effect of the 
constitutional provisions in respect of trial by jury to 
establish a tribunal as part of the frame of government, or 
only to guarantee to the accused the right to such a trial?”198  
Yet when Sutherland turned to analyze the issue, he 
immediately took a novel tack.  With quick strokes, he 
dismissed all prior precedent on the subject as dicta, re-wrote 
the common law tradition, turned the relation between 
Article III’s and the Sixth Amendment’s jury provisions on its 
head, and concluded that the Framers’ had overstated their 
true intent in drafting Article III’s jury mandate.199 
1. Sutherland’s Discussion of Prior Precedent 
Justice Sutherland’s treatment of prior precedent began 
by quoting the statement in Thompson v. Utah200 on which 
Patton “strongly rel[ied]”201  and which “if followed, would 
require”202 that Patton get a new trial because he had no 
power to consent to an eleven-person jury.203  That statement 
was Justice Harlan’s claim in Thompson that “it was not in 
the power of one accused of felony, by consent expressly given 
or by his silence, to authorize a jury of only eight persons to 
pass upon the question of his guilt.”204 
Justice Harlan’s claim, which always had been taken as 
the core meaning of the case,205 was dismissed by Justice 
Sutherland as “an obiter dictum” because Thompson 
 197. See infra text accompanying notes 99–103. 
 198. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930).  
 199. Id. at 293–98.  
 200. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 343 (1898). 
 201. Patton, 281 U.S. at 293. 
 202. Id. at 287.  
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 293 (quoting Thompson, 170 U.S. at 353); see also supra text 
accompanying note 93 (quoting this part of Thompson).  
 205. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 31 F.2d 19, 21 (9th Cir. 1929) (citing 
Thompson for the proposition that a twelve person jury cannot be waived); 
Coates v. United States, 290 F. 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1923) (citing Thompson for 
the proposition that jury trial is “mandatory” and “cannot be waived”); Blair v. 
United States, 241 F. 217, 230 (9th Cir. 1917) (citing Thompson for proposition 
that jury right “cannot . . . be waived”); Freeman v. United States, 227 F. 732, 
750 (2d Cir. 1915) (describing Thompson’s holding).  Justice Harlan certainly 
meant what he wrote in Thompson.  See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 95 
(1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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“involved the validity of a statute dispensing with the 
common-law jury of twelve” and a defendant who “had been 
silent only under constraint of the statute.”206  Thompson, 
read in light of its facts, was not a ruling about “the effect of 
an express consent.”207 
Having swept Thompson aside as dictum, Justice 
Sutherland turned to discussing two of the federal appellate 
court precedents that, he acknowledged, had “definitively” 
held defendant jury waivers unconstitutional.208  One was 
Low v. United States,209 which Sutherland said was “entitled 
to great respect” because it was “rendered by Judge Lurton” 
who later joined the Supreme Court.210  But that was all 
Sutherland said about Low before moving on to the other 
case, Dickinson v. United States.211  He dwelt at length on 
Dickinson; it was the longest sustained discussion of his 
opinion.  However, in discussing Dickinson, Sutherland spent 
less than a sentence describing the case’s facts and holding 
before launching into an extended set of quotations from 
Judge Aldrich’s long-neglected dissent, which he approvingly 
described as “scholarly and thoughtful.”212 
The language Justice Sutherland quoted from Aldrich’s 
dissent touched on a variety of points.  It questioned the 
common sense of banning jury waiver by pointing out that 
defendants not only could waive most of their trial-related 
rights, such as witness confrontation, compulsory process for 
 206. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930).  Justice Sutherland’s 
assertion that Thompson “had been silent only under constraint of the statute,” 
is not necessarily true.  There is no evidence suggesting it.  Thompson may just 
as well have been strategically biding his time, hoping for an acquittal. 
 207. Id.  It should be noted that Harlan thought his remarks were holding, 
not dicta.  See Schick, 195 U.S. at 84–85, 95 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
Nonetheless, in the 1920s, Sutherland’s view that the question of jury waiver as 
open was not unique.  See Frank Grinnell, To What Extent, If At All, Is the 
Right to Jury Trial Optional in Criminal Cases in the Federal Courts?, 9 MASS. 
L. QUART. (No. 4) 61, 61–62 (1924) (incorrectly saying there was no “direct 
decision . . . on the point in the lower Federal courts”); S. Chesterfield 
Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MICH. L. REV. 695, 
720–21 n.66 (1927) (saying Thompson involved an “implied” waiver). 
 208. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294. 
 209. Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 86 (6th Cir. 1909) (discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 30, 102). 
 210. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294.  
 211. Thompson, 159 F. at 801 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 159–
67). 
 212. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294–96.  
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obtaining witnesses, and assistance of counsel, but also could 
obviate the whole trial by pleading guilty.213  It repeated 
Aldrich’s assertion that the English rule against waiver 
originated in a desire to protect the rights of the defendant’s 
family from the disinheriting effects of their kinsman’s felony 
conviction.214  It also reminded the reader that the “aim” of 
the Constitution’s jury trial provisions was a “trial as free and 
fair as the lot of humanity will admit.”215 
When written by Judge Aldrich, these comments were 
expressly grounded in Justice Holmes’s progressive  
constitutionalism and the conviction that constitutional  
arrangements properly changed with the times.216  Since such 
a view was anathema to Justice Sutherland,217 I suggest he 
used them for a different reason.  Placed as they were at the 
end of Sutherland’s description of the relevant federal 
precedents and just before the beginning of his own analysis 
of the jury waiver issue, the purpose of the quoted language 
was ground-clearing.  Like Aldrich, Sutherland thought 
prohibiting jury waiver was illogical, anachronistic and bad 
public policy,218 but the legal import of his policy views was 
the implication that for those reasons a rational Framer or  
ratifier would be unlikely to have constitutionalized the no-
waiver rule. 
This implication was critical to the success of Justice 
Sutherland’s analysis as the argument he was about to make 
affirming the constitutionality of jury waiver was 
extraordinarily weak.  Not all, but much of the persuasive 
force of Sutherland’s argument came from his having 
established at the outset that the no-waiver rule was 
something a rational constitution-maker was unlikely to 
adopt.  In essence, Sutherland’s description of federal 
precedent, with its dismissal of Thompson and his emphasis 
on Aldrich’s Dickinson dissent was a negative argument 
focused on undermining the no-waiver position in order to set 
it up for rejection on the most slender of grounds. 
 213. Id. at 294–95.  
 214. Id. at 296.  
 215. Id. at 294.  
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 165–67. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 183–91. 
 218. See infra text accompanying notes 304–20 (discussing Sutherland’s 
public policy argument). 
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2. Sutherland’s Discussion of Extra-Textual Evidence 
Justice Sutherland knew, indeed, he openly “conceded” in 
another part of the Patton opinion219 “that under the rule of 
the common law the accused was not permitted to waive trial 
by jury, as generally he was not permitted to waive any right 
which was intended for his protection.”220  Nevertheless, in 
his analysis of jury waiver’s constitutionality, Sutherland 
never mentioned that the no-waiver rule was the traditional 
common law rule.  Instead he made two related assertions 
that, like a common law rule, would be considered an extra-
textual proposition valuable for the light it shed on the 
Founders’ understanding of the Constitution’s text.  
Sutherland’s two assertions were: on the one hand, there was 
no evidence from England, the colonies, or Founding-era 
America that “trial by jury in criminal cases was regarded as 
a part of the structure of government,”221 while, on the other 
hand, there was evidence that jury trial “uniformly” was 
regarded as a “privilege of the accused.”222 
Justice Sutherland’s first assertion, even if it is taken 
narrowly to mean direct statements literally describing “the 
jury . . . as an integral and inseparable part of the court”223 is 
something of an overstatement.224  Nonetheless, given the 
general absence of Founding-era discussion of jury waiver, 
the assertion’s inaccuracy is minor and of no consequence for 
this critique.225  Its importance for Sutherland was that it 
 219. Sutherland mentioned the common law rule as part of his discussion of 
whether federal common law should allow jury waiver.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 314–17.  
 220. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) (discussing whether 
jury waiver is against public policy). 
 221. Id. at 296; see also id. at 297 (making the connection to Founding-era 
America).  Throughout his analysis Sutherland uses the discourse of jurisdiction 
theory as his marker for the no-waiver position. Id. at 296–98; supra text 
accompanying notes 129–32 (saying jurisdiction theory includes the view that 
the jury is part of the “structure of government”). 
 222. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296.  
 223. Id. at 297.  
 224. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing Article III’s jury mandate); Note, supra note 26, 
at 48–49 (discussing Hamilton’s and Madison’s views and Blackstone’s and 
Richard Burn’s criticism of summary proceedings). 
 225. The hotly discussed issue for the Constitution-makers was the existence 
of jury trial and the appurtenant rights that accompanied it.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 41–44. 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 68 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 68 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC 3/14/2012  2:57:38 PM 
414 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
stood in contrast and gave determinative weight to his second 
assertion: that there was evidence that the Founding 
generation thought of jury trial as a waivable privilege.226  
Unfortunately, Sutherland’s second assertion is also 
remarkably overstated if not entirely wrong. 
The evidence Justice Sutherland proffered to support his 
second assertion consists entirely of two short quotes to show 
that at the Founding trial by jury was regarded as  
a “privilege of the accused” and not “as a part of the  
structure of government.”227  One quote, from Blackstone’s 
Commentaries,228 was a description of trial by jury as “ ‘ the 
glory of the English law,’ ”  and “ ‘ the most transcendent 
privilege which any subject can enjoy.’ ” 229   The other quote, 
from Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, 230 
stated, “[w]hen our more immediate ancestors removed to 
America, they brought this great privilege with them, as their 
birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable 
common law which had fenced round and interposed barriers 
on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.”231 
Of course, these two quotes are entirely inadequate to 
demonstrate Justice Sutherland’s proposition.  In these 
snippets, Blackstone and Story describe jury trial not merely 
as a “privilege,” but as a “great privilege,” “the most 
transcendent privilege” and “the glory of English law.”232  
Although Sutherland acknowledges the modifiers,233 he hones 
in solely on the word “privilege” to conclude that these two 
leading commentators thought jury trial was something “the 
accused . . . may forego at his election.”234 
 226. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296–98. 
 227. Id. at 296.  Throughout his brief analysis Sutherland used the discourse 
of jurisdiction theory as his marker for the no-waiver position.  Id. at 296–98; 
supra text accompanying notes 129–32 (saying jurisdiction theory includes the 
view that the jury is part of the “structure of government”). 
 228. Patton, 281 U.S. at 297.  
 229. Id. at 297 (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at *279).  
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 
1779 (1833)) (emphasis in original) [Note: The passage Sutherland cites appears 
originally in 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1773, at 
652 (1833).  Sutherland may have miscited it or have been working from a 
different edition.] 
 232. Patton, 281 U.S. at 297 (quoting Blackstone and Story). 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. at 298.  
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However, it was not proper for Sutherland to ignore the 
modifiers and encomiums that Blackstone and Story heaped 
upon jury trial.  The encomiums have some tendency to 
indicate that Blackstone and Story thought of trial by jury as 
having public as well as private importance.  Moreover, if we 
step back from the snippets themselves, we see that 
Blackstone, for example, opposed nonjury trials even for petty 
offenses because of their deleterious effect on the body politic 
and corrupting influence on the judges themselves.235 
The claim here is not that Blackstone thought of jury 
trial as unwaivable.  It is an issue he never directly 
addressed.  Rather, the claim is that Sutherland places far 
more weight on Blackstone’s use of the word “privilege” than 
that slender reed can bear. 
In contrast, Sutherland is entirely wrong in his use of 
Story’s quote.  No attempt to put Story’s prestige behind the 
waivable privilege understanding of jury trial can possibly 
succeed unless it contends with his famous disquisition  
on jury trial in United States v. Gibert.236  As Sutherland 
doubtlessly knew, in those remarks Story maintained that 
jury trial was “imperative upon the courts,” that “prisoners 
can be lawfully tried in no other manner,” and that “[t]he 
constitution decides how [a defendant] shall be tried, 
independent of any election on his part.”237  Story’s Gibert 
opinion surely indicates that someone may describe jury trial 
as a “privilege” yet think of it as a mandatory part of the 
tribunal established to determine a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence. 
The quotes from Blackstone and Story are all the extra-
textual evidence Sutherland offered to show that the 
Founding generation regarded jury trial as a waivable 
“privilege of the accused” and not an unwaivable “part of the 
structure of government.”238  In fact, there was little to no 
discussion of jury waiver before or during the Founding era.  
While jury trial was a subject of much discussion in the 
 235. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *379–80.  Of course, the context of 
Blackstone’s remarks was a discussion of compulsory, not elective, bench trials. 
 236. United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15–
204), discussed supra text accompanying notes 70–79. 
 237. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305–06. 
 238. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296.  
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC 3/14/2012  2:57:38 PM 
416 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
eighteenth century, with some of it occurring at the 
Constitutional Convention and during the ratification 
campaign, the topic of defendant’s waiver was not among the 
subjects debated.  Jury waiver simply was not an issue of the 
day. 
Silence is notoriously difficult for a historian to interpret.  
Given the general inability of defendants to waive jury trial 
in England, the colonies, and the early Republic, silence 
should be taken as cutting in favor of the no- 
waiver position.239  Yet Sutherland felt justified in reaching  
the opposite conclusion because, Blackstone’s and  
Story’s descriptions of jury trial as a “valuable privilege”240 
supposedly provided decisive evidence supporting the 
personal privilege (and therefore, pro-waiver) interpretation 
of Article III’s jury clause. 
3.  Sutherland’s Discussion of the Constitution’s Text 
Justice Sutherland thought that his extra-textual 
argument made it “reasonable to conclude that the Framers 
of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the 
right of trial by jury primarily for the protection of the 
accused.”241   Yet, turning to the Constitution’s text, he 
claimed “[t]hat this was the purpose of the Third Article is 
rendered highly probable by a consideration of the form of 
expression used in the Sixth Amendment.”242 
As previously discussed,243 at least since the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century some reconciliation had always 
been thought necessary between Article III’s peremptory 
command that criminal trials “shall be by jury”244 and the 
Sixth Amendment’s softer language which speaks of jury trial 
as a “right” that “accused shall enjoy.”245  The authoritative 
reconciliation, given by Justice Harlan in Callan v. Wilson,246 
was that the Sixth Amendment fleshed out the details  
of jury trial without compromising Article III’s  
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 297.  
 242. Id. at 297–98.  
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 32–40. 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
 245. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 246. 127 U.S. 540 (1888).  
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mandatory command.247  Sutherland saw the Article III/Sixth 
Amendment relationship differently.  Quoting Harlan’s 
determination that “[t]here is no necessary conflict” between 
the Constitution’s two jury provisions,248 Sutherland said this 
meant that “The first ten amendments and the original 
Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should 
be construed in pari materia.  So construed, the latter 
provision fairly may be regarded as reflecting the meaning of 
the former.  In other words, the two provisions mean 
substantially the same thing.”249  But what Sutherland meant 
was that Article III took on the Sixth Amendment’s 
permissive coloration.250 
With regard to Article III, Section 2’s peremptory 
language, Sutherland thought his extra-textual and textual 
arguments combined to support the “reasonable inference” 
that in writing Article III “the concern of the framers was to 
make clear that the [defendant’s privilege] of jury trial should 
remain inviolable,” and to achieve that important “end no 
language was deemed too imperative.”251 
In effect, Sutherland’s argument turned Harlan’s “no 
conflict” principle on its head by reading the Sixth 
Amendment as the dominant provision.  Sutherland’s use of 
the Sixth Amendment to understand what the Framer’s 
meant by Article III’s jury trial clause supported  
a substantial departure from that Article’s absolute tex- 
tual mandate.252  While Harlan’s position was grounded in  
well-known facts about the politics of the Founding era,253 
Sutherland reached his conclusion without referring to a 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 41–47. 
 248. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Callan, 127 U.S. at 549). 
 249. Id. at 298 (italics in the original).  
 250. Id. (drawing the interaction between Article III and the Sixth 
Amendment the conclusion that “Article III . . . was meant to confer a right 
upon the accused which he may forego at his election.  To deny his power to do 
so, is to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement”).  
 251. Id. at 297. 
 252. Sutherland’s use of the Sixth Amendment for this purpose may be 
regarded as violating a corollary of the “no conflict” principle that Sutherland 
claimed to respect.  The corollary was that the Sixth Amendment “is not to be 
regarded as modifying or altering” Article III.  Id. at 298.  The art of 
Sutherland’s argument was that he could claim he was using the Sixth 
Amendment not to modify Article III, but to understand it. 
 253. Amar, supra note 46, at 1197–98. 
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shred of evidence from the Founding era other than the text 
of the Sixth Amendment and two short quotes from 
Blackstone and Story.254  Sutherland’s argument that the “no 
conflict” principle supported jury waiver was constructed 
entirely from these sources and a “reasonable inference” 
about why the Convention drafted Article III’s jury provision 
with language that was more peremptory than it was meant 
to be.255 
Taken at face value, a unanimous Supreme Court in 1930 
constitutionalized a criminal defendant’s ability, when 
prosecuted for a serious offense, to waive trial by jury because 
that is what the Founding generation meant when, in 1789, it 
wrote “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, 
shall be by jury.”256  According to the Court, speaking through 
Justice Sutherland, the Constitution’s text (the Sixth 
Amendment) and context (Blackstone’s and Story’s calling 
jury trial a “privilege”) pointed to the historically correct 
constitutional rule, a rule that redrafted Article III’s jury 
provision into something less than an absolute requirement 
in order to reflect the Founding generation’s true 
understanding.  Sutherland’s startling conclusion was that 
the Framers had misdrafted Article III’s jury provision, 
overstating what they meant to say. 
B. Accounting for the Patton Decision 
Justice Sutherland’s opinion presents itself as a 
historical excavation.  He writes as if considerations of public 
policy and evolving principles of constitutional law had 
nothing to do with it.  Yet, Akhil Amar is restrained when he 
says, “None of the arguments in Patton v. United States 
survives close scrutiny.” 257   There can be no doubt that 
 254. Patton, 281 U.S. at 297–98. 
 255. See supra text accompanying note 251 (quoting Sutherland).  This is not 
the only time that an investigation of the constitutional draftsmen’s true intent 
has redrafted explicit constitutional text.  The construction of the Twenty-First 
Amendment’s second section may be another.  See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 
U.S. 460 (2005); Laurence Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really 
Trying, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 98, 99 
(William Eskridge & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). 
 256. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 257. Amar, supra note 46, at 1197. 
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Patton’s historical analysis is remarkably wrong.258 
How do we account for Patton’s sudden break with a 
century and a half of constitutional tradition that itself 
reflected common law history, the Constitution’s text, and 
Founding era practice?  Patton may well be an instance of 
result-driven jurisprudence, and, given Justice Sutherland’s 
legal philosophy, a paradigmatic example of what Andrew 
Koppelman has called “phony originalism.”259  Much of what 
follows will seem to be driving to that conclusion, but in the 
end, I suggest that Justice Sutherland, in the grip of 
“motivated reasoning,” may well have believed his 
implausible analysis. 
My argument begins by describing the early-twentieth-
century changes in the administration of criminal justice and 
related changes in social and legal thought that made the no-
waiver rule an anachronistic and much criticized rule of 
public policy.  It then establishes Justice Sutherland’s full 
agreement with his contemporaries’ criticism of the rule.  
Next, my argument describes an emergent body of historical 
scholarship that challenged the no-waiver rule’s claim to be 
the Founding generation’s intended rule.  It concludes by 
 258. In addition to the shortcomings of Patton’s history, Patton may be 
unfortunate as a matter of constitutional theory and constitutional policy.  As a 
matter of theory, there is a rising tide of criticism of Patton’s view of waiver of 
trial-related rights generally.  See Appleman, supra note 2; King, supra note 95; 
Mazzone, supra note 111.  In terms of policy, although I agree with Patton’s 
outcome—that is, permitting jury waiver (under living, not original, 
constitutional principles)—Patton contains dicta indicating that defendants 
should not be able to insist on one.  In a development that can only be termed 
farcical, Sutherland concluded his Patton opinion with a paean to jury trial as 
“the normal . . . and preferable mode” of trial and a “right” that “must be 
jealously preserved,” by which he meant, in part, that “before any waiver can 
become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the 
court must be had.”  Patton, 281 U.S. at 312.  Due to these dicta, ever since 
Patton, a defendant who wants a bench trial needs to secure permission from 
his prosecutor.  Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1965); Fred 
DeCicco, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment of 
the “Prosecutorial Veto,” 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091 (1983); Adam Kurland, 
Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant With a Unilateral Right to a Bench 
Trial, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1993); Note, Inability to Waive Jury Trial in 
the Federal Courts, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 722 (1965).  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure codifies this understanding.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 23. 
 259. Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 749 (2009) (defining “phony originalism” as an 
“originalism . . . which is opportunistically used to advance substantive 
positions that the judge[] finds congenial”). 
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establishing that Justice Sutherland agreed with this new 
historical scholarship and argues that given the new history, 
Justice Sutherland could have ruled as he did and still felt he 
had complied with his originalist jurisprudential norms. 
As a preliminary matter, it may be noted that Patton’s 
arguments and analysis should be understood as expressing 
the thinking of Justices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds and 
Van Devanter, who together composed the Court’s 
conservative wing.260   Though the Patton decision was 
unanimous and there was no other opinion, Justices 
Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone are noted as concurring in the 
result only.261  Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Patton is a 
statement wholly reflecting his jurisprudence and the 
jurisprudence of his conservative colleagues, who presumably 
were equally originalist.  In Patton, Sutherland’s analysis 
was unqualified by the need to attract the votes of Justices 
who might decide cases according to the norms of a “living 
Constitution.”262 
Nonetheless, despite Sutherland’s originalist juris-
prudence, Patton clearly reflects evolving principles of 
constitutional law.  Although constituting the jury as a 
necessary and unwaivable part of a criminal trial was the 
preferred public policy at the Founding, permitting jury 
waivers undoubtedly was the favored policy of the third 
decade of the twentieth century. 
 
 260. It is possible that the Patton opinion expressed only Sutherland’s views, 
as the modern practice of circulating opinions before their issuance was 
“informal and occasional before 1947.”  See G. Edward White, The Internal 
Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1463, 1505 (2006). 
 261. Patton, 281 U.S. at 313.  Chief Justice Hughes, the Court’s remaining 
progressive, joined the Court after Patton’s argument and did not participate in 
the decision.  Id.  Justice Sanford, who died a week and a half after Patton’s 
argument was reported as agreeing with “a disposition of the case in accordance 
with [the] opinion.”  Sutherland’s opinion, released a month and a half later, did 
not have to reflect his views. 
 262. It is unfortunate that none of the concurring Justices chose to write out 
the rationale for their vote.  It might have made an intriguing contrast to 
Sutherland’s opinion. 
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1. Docket Overload and the Critique of Jury Trial in the 
1920s 
From the Founding through the Civil War, jury trial was 
required in the prosecution of serious crime in all states 
except Maryland.263  By the turn of the twentieth century, 
only three more states had departed from that rule.264  As late 
as the 1920s, “the only alternative to a guilty plea in most 
states was a jury trial.”265  It was between 1925 and 1935 that 
the majority of the states reversed course and began to  
allow jury waiver in prosecution for serious crime.266  The 
 263. See Appleman, supra note 2, at 421–26, 439–40; Hon. Carroll T. Bond, 
The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges Alone, Without 
Juries, 11 A.B.A. J. 699, 700–01 (1925); Griswold, supra note 54, at 667–69; 
King, supra note 95, at 125–26; Towne, supra note 61, at 149–52.  Bruce Smith’s 
demonstration that in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century New York 
bench trials were allowed for a wide variety of significant crime indicates that 
the boundary between “petty” and “serious” crime was not settled and 
encompassed more important crimes than the modern conception.  Smith’s work 
should not be understood as suggesting that there was no requirement for jury 
trial for serious crimes.  See Bruce P. Smith, A New Verdict on Criminal Jury 
Trial in Antebellum America (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author) (studying New York’s increasing insistence on the norm and narrowing 
conception of the petty crime exception).  Smith’s work suggests that at mid-
century the no-waiver norm was more stringently conceived and enforced than 
it was at the Founding.  This conclusion regarding the growth of the norm is 
also supported by the fact that most forthright and forceful nineteenth-century 
precedents on the jury trial requirement date from the 1840s and 1850s.  See, 
e.g., Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 134–39 (1858); Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498, 
500 (1847). 
 264. DAVID BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 85–86 (1992); Towne, supra note 61, at 152, 157–59 
(mentioning Maryland, Connecticut, Indiana, and Louisiana).  Towne says “at 
least” four states departed from the rule in the late-nineteenth century, but I 
have found no more than four.  See Annotation, Right to Waive Trial by Jury in 
Criminal Cases, 48 A.L.R. 767, 767–69, 772–75 (1927) (comprehensive listing of 
cases). 
 265. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 33 (emphasis supplied); see also Abraham 
Goldberg, Waiver of Jury in Felony Trials, 28 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164 (1929) (a 
1929 law review article listing only seven states that permit felony bench 
trials). 
 266. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 33 (saying jury waiver was “almost 
universally” adopted by 1935); King, supra note 95, at 127 (dating the general 
acceptance of jury waiver to the mid-1920s); Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 703 
(upholding waiver is “a distinct tendency . . . in more recent years”); Recent 
Decisions, supra note 61, at 1064 (1930) (saying that permitting jury waiver was 
“[t]he trend of recent cases”).  By 1947, all but seventeen states permitted bench 
trials in at least some felony cases.  William Handley, Jr., Some Observations on 
Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 1 Tex. L. & Leg. 45, 54 (1947).  A 1993 
study found that only North Carolina still prohibited jury waiver in felony 
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movement to permitting jury waiver was a societal 
phenomenon. 
The abrupt switch in state constitutional law—which  
was reflected, complemented and spurred on by the  
Patton decision—was decades in the making.267  Rather than 
resulting from anything new, it was like a dam bursting 
under the accumulating pressures of social, political, 
philosophical, and jurisprudential change.  Opinion favoring 
the jury trial requirement had begun to shift in the last third 
of the nineteenth century.268  By the 1910s and 1920s, public 
and professional disenchantment with jury trial had reached 
flood tide.269  In those years, according to one contemporary 
trials.  Kurland, supra note 258, at 323.  A few more states refuse to allow it in 
capital cases.  Id. at 322. 
 267. See James A. C. Grant, Felony Trials Without a Jury, 25 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 980, 980–84 (1931) (discussing juryless trials in the states); Grant, supra 
note 34, at 135–41 (same); Perkins, supra note 33, at 49 (describing Patton as 
“the culmination of three-quarters of a century of judicial thought” and saying 
“its influence [in the states] has already assumed significant proportions”).  At 
the time of the Patton decision, about fifteen states permitted jury waiver in at 
least some felony cases, twenty-four forbade it, and the law in nine states was 
unclear.  Grant, supra note 34, at 146.  In England, the movement to permit 
bench trials for serious offenses began somewhat earlier with the Juvenile 
Offenders Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., c. 82 and was completed with the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, just about when America made its 
transition.  Handley, supra note 266, at 45–46; Pendleton Howard, The Rise of 
Summary Jurisdiction in English Criminal Law Administration, 19 CALIF. L. 
REV. 486, 491–97 (1931).  In 2004, England began to go further and abolished 
jury trial entirely for several classes of serious crime.  Peter Thornton, Q.C., 
Trial by Jury: 50 Years of Change, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 119, 119 & n.7 (2004). 
 268. The movement away from the no-waiver rule is evidenced by the fact 
that in the last third of the nineteenth century three states joined Maryland in 
permitting nonjury trials.  See supra text accompanying note 264.  It is also 
evidenced by the increasing disaffection with the twelve-person jury 
requirement.  Towne, supra note 61, at 152–57; see also 1 JOEL BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 543–44 (2d ed. 1872) 
(leading treatise writer expressing support for defendant’s jury waiver when 
“expressly authorized by statute”); STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 224–28 (1889) (reviewing but disagreeing with recent cases 
allowing waiver); Elliott, supra note 128, at 183–85 (commentator giving only 
equivocal support to the no-waiver and twelve-person jury rules). 
 269. Consider the following sampling of articles written in the 1920s cited in 
Rollin Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases (pt. 2), 16 IOWA L. 
REV. 223, 223 nn.130–31 (1931): Editorials, Shall the Jury System be Abolished, 
35 W. VA. L.Q. 277 (1929); Bruce Sebille, Trial by Jury an Ineffective Survival, 
59 AM. L. REV. 65 (1925); J. C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury, 57 AM. L. REV. 42 
(1923).  See also Grant, Felony, supra note 267 (a study of nonjury trials that 
commends them).  For additional scholarly criticisms of the jury, accompanied 
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commentator, “forward looking members of the Bar and of the 
laity” were so discontented with jury trial that they 
propounded suggestions that ran “from the one extreme of 
modification . . . to that of complete abolition.”270 
The primary cause of the avalanche of discontent with 
jury trial was that urbanization and industrialization, the 
rise of regulatory government,271  the advent of state and 
national prohibition,272  and a manifold increase both the 
crime rate273  and in the number of legislatively defined 
criminal offenses274 had dramatically increased the criminal 
caseload up to and beyond the point of docket overload.275  
Court congestion meant delay that not only provoked public 
disrespect for the criminal justice system276 but also harmed 
unbailed defendants who languished in lengthy pre-trial 
detention.277  Docket overload set off a search for reforms 
aimed at “mak[ing] criminal procedure more adaptable to the 
prompt dispatch of business.”278 
In this context, proponents of abandoning the no-waiver 
rule for serious criminal offenses pitched their suggestion as a 
moderate and practical reform that effectively streamlined 
the criminal process.279  Bench trials, they said, reduced court 
congestion by permitting less complex and drawn out trial 
by suggestions of reform, see Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 916–22; 
Oppenheim, supra note 207.  Perkins traces disenchantment with jury trial 
among legal scholars to the early 1900s.  Perkins, supra, at 223 n.131 (citing, 
inter alia, Alfred Coxe, The Trials of Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 286 (1901); 
Edson Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302 
(1915); G.H. Williams, Abolition of the Jury System, 20 N.J. L.J. 50 (1906)).  I 
have found earlier expressions of dissatisfaction. See supra note 268 (citing 
BISHOP, supra note 268, and Elliott, supra note 128). 
 270. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 163. 
 271. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 976.  
 272. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 32. 
 273. Handley, supra note 266, at 45.  
 274. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 32. 
 275. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 52, at 32; Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra 
note 10, at 920, 976. 
 276. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 695. 
 277. Grant, supra note 267, at 992; Perkins, supra note 269, at 224. 
 278. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 695–96. 
 279. BODENHAMER, supra note 264, at 85; Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 
695–96 (general claim of bench trial’s greater efficiency); Petty Offense Category, 
supra note 6, at 1304 (“[E]xperience . . . goes far to justify [jury waiver] . . . at 
least on the ground of administrative expedience.”). 
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processes280 and by necessitating a “smaller number of new 
trials, appeals and reversals”281 due to their “greater security 
against error.”282 
Reduced court congestion was only one of a wide variety 
of benefits that early twentieth-century commentators 
expected to follow from permitting defendants to opt for a 
bench trial.  As a more expeditious and less error-prone 
process, commentators said bench trials would reduce 
government budgets by reducing the financial cost of trial 
practice.283  Commentators also commended bench trials for 
their greater accuracy, due to their belief that factual 
determinations would be made by a judge’s “keen, critical, 
and trained mind.”284  This reform was especially important 
in cases where sensational newspaper reporting, the 
defendant’s prior record, or the racial or sexual nature of the 
offense had stirred up community prejudice.285  Not only were 
defendants thought to welcome the option of bench trial in 
such cases, but it was said that in every case, whether the 
defendant elected bench or jury trial, he was more likely to 
appreciate the trial process because it was chosen rather than 
imposed.286 
Legal commentators also recommended optional bench 
trials as a desirable means to stave off another recently 
arisen technique for avoiding the delay, expense, and hazard 
of mandatory jury trial: the plea bargain.287  Historians of 
plea bargaining agree that the same years that witnessed the 
demise of the no-waiver rule also witnessed the rise of plea 
 280. Grant, supra note 267, at 993. 
 281. Perkins, supra note 269, at 225. 
 282. Grant, supra note 267, at 993. 
 283. Id.; Perkins, supra note 269, at 225.  Reducing expenses was especially 
appreciated with the advent of the Great Depression. 
 284. Grant, supra note 267, at 993; see also Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 
714–15 (commenting on the judiciary’s “greater experience” and “integrity”). 
 285. Grant, supra note 267, at 993; Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696, 714; 
Perkins, supra note 269, at 225; see also Handley, supra note 266, at 50–51 
(later commentator making the same point).  During the McCarthy era, scholars 
argued that criminal defendants should have a unilateral right to insist on a 
bench trial to avoid community prejudice.  See Kurland, supra note 258, at 313 
n.13. 
 286. Perkins, supra note 269, at 224 (speaking of jury trials). 
 287. Grant, supra note 267, at 994; Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 
S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 127 (1928); Perkins, supra note 269, at 225–26. 
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bargaining.288  The growth and grudging acceptance of plea 
bargaining was a response to the same pressures that 
promoted the desire for jury waiver.289  Immersed in a society 
that was just emerging from regarding with alarm any jury 
trial avoidance technique other than a freely given guilty 
plea, some commentators recommended the option of bench 
trial for the “decided reduction in the growing practice of 
‘bargaining for pleas.’ ” 290 
The final practical reason advanced in support of 
departing from the no-waiver rule reflected class and ethnic 
prejudice of the governing elite.  Urbanization and 
immigration from a diverse array of countries meant that 
jury panels were likely to be populated by an ethnically 
diverse group of laborers.  As one commentator wrote, “A 
substantial reduction in the call for jury service might make 
it possible to improve very materially the quality of jurors 
chosen.”291 
Beyond the practical reasons, commentators in the 1920s 
argued for overturning the no-waiver rule on theoretical 
grounds. It is startling how completely the critical 
commentary published in the 1920s turned the prior analysis 
on its head to find sufficient the very arguments that before 
had been found insufficient.  Now, for example, the ability of 
defendants to plead guilty was taken to completely undercut 
the no-waiver rule’s pretensions.  S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, 
for example, before elaborating a variety of circumstances 
that might influence “innocent persons” to enter a plea of 
guilty, dismissed the claim that guilty pleas were different 
from jury waivers simply by asking rhetorically: 
 
 288. See Alschuler, supra note 52, at 24–33; King, supra note 95, at 125–27. 
 289. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 6, 24–33; Albert Alschuler & Andrew Deiss, 
A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
867, 924–25 (1994); King, supra note 95, at 125–27; Langbein, supra note 52, at 
270 (linking plea bargaining with the slow emergence of, and judicial prejudice 
against, jury waiver); Mazzone, supra note 111, at 853–54 (linking attitudes 
towards plea bargaining and jury waiver). 
 290. Perkins, supra note 269, at 225–26; see also BODENHAMER, supra note 
264, at 86–87 (discussing opposition to plea bargaining and its slow acceptance); 
Grant, Felony, supra note 267, at 994–95; Mazzone, supra note 111, at 852–54 
(a contemporary analysis of the connection between plea bargaining and jury 
waiver); Moley, supra note 287, at 127. 
 291. Perkins, supra note 269, at 224. 
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If the public have an interest in the liberties of the 
individual to the extent of making a jury trial mandatory, 
is that interest less important when the accused elects to 
avoid any trial?  Should the exercise of his will be ignored 
in the one case and respected in the other?292 
The ability of defendants to waive so many other trial related 
rights, which before was explained by distinguishing between 
fundamental and incidental rights, 293  now was seen as 
problematic.  The dichotomization of rights into separate 
categories suddenly was less important than the fact that the 
Constitution referred to them all as rights.  Therefore, the 
newly preferred argument was that “there is no reason why 
the right to trial by jury should be regarded as standing upon 
any different footing than other rights conferred by the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, which have been held to be 
waivable.”294 
Even the very notion of a public interest separate from 
the sum of private interests came to be doubted.  Jury waiver 
was reconceived as a question of public policy addressing 
whether “the welfare of the individual and the state demand 
a mandatory jury trial.”295  The answer to such a question, it 
was said, “depends upon a balancing of all [relevant] 
factors,”296 an activity which typically was more suited for 
legislatures than courts.  Accordingly, “[t]he courts should be 
hesitant to invade the domain of [the legislature] by reading 
their predilections into the constitutional limitations 
governing the jury and thus to substitute their judgment for 
the judgment of the legislature concerning a function that is 
best expressed by enactment.”297 
At bottom, the theoretical attack expressed a shift in the 
jurisprudential commitments of scholarly commentators from 
formalism to realism and sociological jurisprudence.298  More 
 292. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 716; see also Patton v. United States, 281 
U.S. 276, 305–06 (1930); Brief for the United States at 27, Patton, 281 U.S. at 
276 (No. 53). 
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43. 
 294. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 26. 
 295. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 713. 
 296. Id. at 712–13. 
 297. Id. at 713. 
 298. On the shift from formalism to sociological jurisprudence, see, e.g., 
MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST 
FORMALISM (1949); Julius Stone, Roscoe Pound and Sociological Jurisprudence, 
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generally, the theoretical argument against the traditional 
no-waiver rule reflected liberal individualism’s final  
triumph as the dominant national creed.299  This creedal shift 
encouraged judges and commentators to interpret 
constitutional rights as individual privileges rather than 
collective rights.300  Indeed, in one illustrative aside, Rollin 
Perkins, whose critical analysis was more even-handed than 
most because it discussed strengths and weaknesses on both 
sides, could not help but demean the “citizen-training” branch 
of the old public interest theory301 by dismissing it with the 
wry comment that it was “[p]erhaps the most unique 
suggestion along these lines.”302 
Due to this creedal shift, the intellectual apparatus 
required to understand the traditional theoretical support for 
the no-waiver rule had vanished.  One looks in vain through 
the critical literature of the 1920s for any notion that the 
“public interest” is something other than the sum of private 
interests.  Indeed, the absence of any discussion of the “public 
interest” is among the most telling pieces of evidence of 
demonstrating the connection between the rise of liberal 
individualism and the demise of the no-waiver rule.  The 
commentators in the 1920s lacked the intellectual framework 
to conceive the traditional and formerly dominant public 
interest theory as it had been—as a right protecting and 
valorizing the public’s participation in the administration of 
criminal justice. 
Of course, the intellectual shift was not, all by itself, 
sufficient to undermine the theoretical foundations of the no-
waiver rule.  It worked in tandem with a host of social, 
professional, political, and experiential changes.  In the late-
eighteenth century, it is inconceivable that the following 
argument against the no-waiver rule would have been 
considered persuasive by much of the population: 
78 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1965). 
 299. See DANIEL HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY 8–9, 170–71 (2007) 
(discussing the post-Civil War triumph of liberalism over republicanism). 
 300. The shift regarding jury waiver was part of a general shift in the 
conceptualization of the Constitution’s procedural rights from “public good” to 
“privilege of an individual.”  King, supra note 95, at 120. 
 301. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22. 
 302. Perkins, supra note 33, at 25 n.33.  The “citizen training” rationale is 
discussed supra text accompanying notes 119–22. 
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Confidence in fairer treatment by the judge, based upon 
the high quality and integrity of the personnel of the 
judiciary, or the conviction that the greater responsibility 
of the judgeship and the greater dignity and permanence 
of the bench as compared with the fleeting character and 
irresponsibility of the jury will conduce to a more 
conscientious consideration of the case on its merits.  
Attitude of counsel may influence a choice made upon this 
ground.303 
In the 1920s, however, it was unanswerable. 
2. Sutherland’s Agreement with the 1920s’ Critique of 
the No-Waiver Rule 
Justice Sutherland fully agreed with his contemporaries’ 
critique of the traditional no-waiver rule.  Like his 
contemporaries, he was a strong proponent of permitting 
bench trials.  Large sections of Sutherland’s Patton opinion 
are occupied by lengthy quotes of other judges’ criti- 
cisms of the no-waiver rule, expressly adopting some  
and implicitly adopting others as his own.304  In addition, at  
times Sutherland spoke for himself. 305  On these occasions, 
Sutherland pointed to the differences between the common 
law and modern criminal trial to show that although the no-
waiver rule may have been appropriate in the past, it now 
was anachronistic.  At common law, even though a guilty 
verdict frequently meant a death sentence,306 forfeiture of all 
inheritable property,307  or some other punishment “out  
of all proportion to the gravity of [the] crime,”308  common law 
procedural rules barred the accused from such basic 
protections as testifying on his own behalf or having a 
lawyer.309  In light of the panoply of rights that surround the 
modern trial process, Sutherland said, “the rule of the 
 303. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 714–15. 
 304. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 294–96, 303–06, 307–09 (1930); 
supra text accompanying notes 212–18 (discussing Judge Aldrich’s dissent).  At 
times, Justice Sutherland expressed his agreement with the quoted passages 
sentiments.  Id. at 307.  At other times he just said they were “thoughtful.”  Id. 
at 294–95. 
 305. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294, 298–301, 305–07. 
 306. Id. at 307 (quoting Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (Wis. 1910)). 
 307. Id.  
 308. Id. (quoting Hack, 124 N.W. at 494). 
 309. Id. 
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common law . . . was justified by conditions which no longer 
exist,”310 and “with their disappearance justification for the 
old rule no longer rests on a substantial basis.”311 
Sutherland also pointed to the defendant’s power to 
“plead guilty and thus dispense with a trial altogether”312 as 
completely undercutting the no-waiver rule’s pretensions to 
be sensible public policy or theoretically coherent.  In 
Sutherland’s view, 
[I]f the state may interpose the claim of public interest 
between the accused and his desire to waive a jury trial, a 
fortiori it should be able to interpose a like claim between 
him and his determination to avoid any form of trial by 
admitting his guilt . . . . [P]ublic policy is not so 
inconsistent as to permit the accused to dispense with 
every form of trial by a plea of guilty, and yet forbid him to 
dispense with a particular form of trial by consent.313 
Sutherland’s remarks negatively assessing the no-waiver 
rule on public policy and legal-theoretic grounds were not 
casual asides.  In Patton, the Court permitted jury waiver on 
its own authority because there was no congressional statute 
authorizing it.314   Therefore, in Patton, after finding that 
Article III permitted jury waiver, Sutherland was required to 
go on and decide whether federal common law also permitted 
it.315  Due to Patton’s legal context, Sutherland’s extended 
remarks on the no-waiver rule’s policy and theory were as 
central to the case’s ultimate outcome as his ruling on 
whether Article III permitted jury waiver. 
It was in this latter part of the opinion that Sutherland 
discussed jury waiver from the standpoint of public policy and 
legal theory.  It was also in this discussion that Sutherland 
flatly “conceded . . . that under the rule of the common law 
the accused was not permitted to waive trial by jury, as 
 310. Id. at 306; see also id. at 307. 
 311. Id. at 307. 
 312. Id. at 305.  
 313. Id. at 305–06.  Sutherland also thought the defendant’s power to waive 
his other Sixth Amendment rights raised substantial questions about why he 
could not also waive a jury altogether.  Id. at 294–95 (quoting Judge Aldrich). 
 314.  See Grant, supra note 34, at 156 (saying that Congress should adopt a 
statute on the subject).  All Justice Sutherland claimed in Patton was that there 
was no statute “requiring jury trial.”  Patton, 281 U.S. at 299. 
 315. Patton, 281 U.S. at 302–13.  
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generally he was not permitted to waive any right which was 
intended for his protection.”316  In light of the traditional rule, 
it was essential to Patton’s outcome that Sutherland’s 
common law jurisprudence permitted judicial evolution of the 
law.  Sutherland thought judicial evolution of the common 
law had to be legitimate because, on the one hand, the 
common law was based on the judiciary’s understanding of 
good public policy while, on the other hand, “[t]he public 
policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, 
be the public policy of another.”317 
To Sutherland, the propriety of judicial changes in the 
common law followed from the fundamental precept that 
similar, but only similar, cases should be treated the same.  If 
the conditions that justified applying a certain rule to a case 
changed, continuing to apply the rule would be treating 
dissimilar cases the same.318  Observing that conditions no 
longer supported the no-waiver rule,319 Sutherland concluded 
that it was entirely “contrary to the spirit of the common law 
itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason to a case 
where that reason utterly fails—cessante ratione legis, cessat 
ipsa lex.”320 
In sum, it cannot be doubted that Sutherland agreed with 
his contemporaries that modern public policy and legal theory 
supported jury waiver and bench trial rather than the 
traditional no-waiver rule. 
3. The Historical Critique of the No-Waiver Rule 
Sutherland, of course, was quite aware that he viewed 
the propriety of common law evolution differently from and 
the propriety of constitutional evolution.  Indeed, he included 
 316. Id. at 306.  
 317. Id. 
 318. I see this as implicit in Sutherland’s remarks leading up to his quotation 
from the Reno Smelting Works case.  See id. (quoting Reno Smelting Works v. 
Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 320 (Nev. 1889)). 
 319. Id. at 308.  
 320. Id. at 306 (quoting Reno Smelting Works, 21 P. at 320) (italics in 
original).  Sutherland’s discussion, in Patton, of common law evolution has 
become a leading precedent justifying a large number of judicial reforms of 
federal criminal procedure rules when they are based on common law rather 
than constitutional or statutory grounds.  See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 
U.S. 371, 381 (1933); United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 983 (9th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1952). 
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in his discussion of the federal common law a reminder that 
his analysis would be different if the no-waiver rested on 
either “constitutional or statutory provisions.”321  According to 
Sutherland’s jurisprudence, judges might create and change 
the common law, but they only applied and should never 
change the law as determined by legislatures or the sovereign 
people.322 
Therefore, Sutherland’s rejection of the no-waiver rule’s 
policy and theoretical supports should not have been enough 
to lead him to reject it as the constitutionally required rule.  
For Sutherland to reject the no-waiver rule, something else 
was needed.  And there was something else: In the 1920s, 
along with the wholesale rejection of the policy and 
theoretical support of the no-waiver rule, there emerged a 
body of historical scholarship that questioned the no-waiver 
rule’s claim to be the rule intended by the Founding 
generation.323 
This emergent body of scholarship assailed the historical 
bonafides of the no-waiver rule through two different lines of 
attack.  One line focused on the well-known fact that jury 
trial was never the “exclusive mode of determining the fate of 
the accused” at common law.324  As discussed above, besides 
jury trial, defendants might choose trial by battle or refuse to 
plead and be crushed to death.325  To the historically-minded 
critics of the no-waiver rule, this meant that “in theory . . . 
jury trial . . . was volitional”326 and it “was in principle 
founded upon a choice.”327  The turn to criminal juries, they 
said, “came . . . gradually, and by way of the consent of the 
accused, willing or forced.”328  The import for the twentieth 
 321. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306. 
 322. See supra text accompanying notes 184–91, 317–20. 
 323. The policy- and history-based attacks on the no-waiver rule were 
interconnected, at least as a matter of the sociology of the profession.  Frank 
Grinnell, for example, who was a central mover in the development of the “new 
history” was a strong supporter of jury waiver and clearly developed the 
historical critique to further its chances for success.  See infra text 
accompanying note 333. 
 324. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696. 
 325. See Grinnell, supra note 59, at 17–20; supra text accompanying notes 
53–55. 
 326. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696. 
 327. Id. at 697. 
 328. Id. at 696 n.3 (quoting James Thayer). 
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century of this line of argument was, “There is nothing 
strange or new . . . in the idea that the defendant should 
choose the method of trial which he prefers.  On the contrary, 
the theory of a choice was part of the origin of the 
institution.”329 
The other line of historical critique focused on jury trial 
practice in the American colonies.  Historians had always 
taught that although the colonists based their legal system on 
“the mother country” they did this with “some variations.”330  
In the 1920s, drawing on recently published archival 
material, Frank Washburn Grinnell asserted that a 
defendant’s jury-trial waiver was among the variations in 
Massachusetts.331 Judge Carroll Taney Bond did the same for 
Maryland.332 
Grinnell was a leader of the Massachusetts Bar in the 
first half of the twentieth century with a strong interest in 
both law reform and legal history.333  In addition to other 
forms of professional service, he helped found the 
Massachusetts Judicial Council, and was, for forty-five years, 
the Editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly.  As the 
Quarterly’s Editor, Grinnell invited Judge Bond, who was a 
prominent, history-minded Baltimore judge, to write an 
article describing Maryland’s unique experience with bench 
trials.334  Bond’s article caught the profession’s attention and 
was republished in expanded form four years later in the 
 329. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 17. 
 330. Id. at 20. 
 331. See id.; Grinnell, supra note 207, at 66–67; Frank Grinnell, Election of 
Jury Trial in Criminal Cases in Colonial Massachusetts, 8 MASS. L. QUART. (No. 
2) 106 (1922); infra text accompanying notes 341–66 (discussing Grinnell’s 
research). 
 332. Bond, supra note 263; Carroll T. Bond, The Maryland Practice of 
Allowing Defendants in Criminal Cases to Choose a Trial Before a Judge or a 
Jury Trial, 6 MASS. L. QUART. (No. 4) 89 (1921).  Carroll Bond is discussed infra 
note 334. 
 333. For the remarks in this paragraph on Grinnell, see RICHARD HALE, JR. 
& FRANK WASHBURN GRINNELL, 76 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 3RD SERIES, 154 (1964); Obituary, Frank W. Grinnell, 
1873–1964, 50 A.B.A. J. 587 (1964). 
 334. In 1924, Bond was promoted from the Baltimore court to the Maryland 
Court of Appeals and became its Chief Judge.  He served in that capacity for 
twenty years until his death in 1944.  Bond’s interest in history is illustrated by 
his book, CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY 
(1928).  On Grinnell’s invitation see Bond, Allowing Defendants, supra note 332, 
at 89. 
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Journal of the American Bar Association.  Bond traced 
nonjury trial in colonial Maryland back to 1693.335  According 
to Bond, nonjury trial had “become a common method of 
trying misdemeanor cases” 336  in Maryland by the mid-
eighteenth century and by the century’s end it had been put 
on a secure statutory footing.337  Bond was circumspect in his 
claims, however.  He clearly indicated that until 1823 jury 
waiver was “resorted to chiefly in minor cases”338 and only for 
misdemeanors.339  His moderate conclusion was merely that 
his findings “suggest the need of an investigation of facts 
before any statement is made that trial by jury in criminal 
cases was the only form known to the early American law.  It 
is possible to assume too close an adherence to English 
practice in the colonies.”340 
Frank Grinnell’s findings were more startling.  Drawing 
from the recently published Records of the Court of Assistants 
of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 341  which covered the 
years 1673 to 1692,342  Grinnell showed “to the point of 
demonstration”343 that Bay colony defendants had the ability 
to choose between jury or bench trials even when prosecuted 
for such serious felonies as adultery, manslaughter,  
and treason.344  Drawing from additional sources,345 Grinnell 
suggested that statutes authorizing this practice dated back 
 335. Bond, supra note 263, at 699. 
 336. Id. at 700. 
 337. Bond, supra note 263, at 700–01; Bond, Allowing Defendants, supra note 
332, at 91–92. 
 338. Bond, supra note 263, at 701. 
 339. Id. at 699–701 (every reported instance is a misdemeanor); Bond, 
Allowing Defendants, supra note 332, at 91 (statutory authorization for 
misdemeanor trials). 
 340. Bond, supra note 263, at 699. 
 341. 1–3 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1901–28).  Volume 1, which is the only volume referred 
to by Grinnell was published in 1901.  See Harvard University, HOLLIS 
Catalogue Entry No. 001521139 (title search, last conducted on 11/30/2009).  
Volume 2, covering records from 1630 to 1644 was issued in 1904.  See id.  
Volume 3, which was released in 1928 after Grinnell’s article was written, 
contains fragmentary records dating from 1642 to 1673.  See id. 
 342. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 26 (citing only to Volume 1 and giving these 
years). 
 343. Id. at 29. 
 344. Id. at 26–30.  
 345. Id. at 20–26, 29–30. 
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to 1634.346  In sum, Grinnell’s findings were that seventeenth 
century colonial Massachusetts recognized defendants’ “right 
to a jury trial as an optional right” 347  that permitted 
defendants to elect either trial by jury or the bench.348  In 
Massachusetts, bench trial practice was not only older than in 
Maryland,349 but wider in scope. 
Massachusetts’ bench trial practice was not as 
continuous, however.  Waiver-based bench trial for serious 
crime in colonial Massachusetts apparently ended in or 
shortly after 1685.350  The last example Grinnell found in the 
published Court of Assistants records was from 1685, 351 
although the Court’s records continued until 1692, the year 
the Court was dissolved.352  Grinnell knew of no later instance 
of any Massachusetts court conducting a waiver-based bench 
trial.353  Of course, Grinnell also knew that at the time he 
wrote no Massachusetts colonial court records later than 1692 
had been published.354  Yet for a variety of reasons, such as 
changes in the wording of colonial statutes governing 
criminal procedure,355 he spurned explaining the disappear-
ance of the bench trials in terms of the unavailability of 
 346. Id. at 26.  In at least some of his conclusions, Grinnell was following 
CHARLES HILKEY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1630–
86 (1910).  See Grinnell, supra note 59, at 26 (referring to Hilkey).  
 347. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 29 (emphasis in original). 
 348. Id. at 15, 26, 29. 
 349. Id. at 15. 
 350. Various dates are suggested by the sources, none later than 1694.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rose, 153 N.E. 537, 540 (Mass. 1926) (from 1694 on, no 
record of bench trials); Towne, supra note 61, at 125 (saying lasted reported 
case is 1685).  On p. 128, Towne gives 1695 as a date for a mention of bench 
trial, but that seems to be a misprint since the Court of Assistants was 
dissolved before then.  Towne, supra note 61, at 128. 
 351. Grinnell does not date most of the cases he mentions.  The last case he 
covers is “the case of William Coward,” which is on pp. 319–20 of Volume 1 of 
the Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay.  
Grinnell, supra note 59, at 29.  Coward’s case is on a later page than Joseph 
Holmes Sen & Jun’s case, which is the last case covered by Griswold and 
Towne.  Griswold, supra note 54, at 663; Towne, supra note 61, at 125. 
 352. Towne, supra note 61, at 128 n.25 (court dissolved after 1691). 
 353. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 11–12. 
 354. Id. at 29. 
 355. Id. at 30, 32–33.  Among Grinnell’s other reasons were the absence of 
waiver-based jury trials when published records began again in the early 
Republic era and the opinion, the opinion of the colonial and state bar, and the 
failure of defendants to request it.  Id. at 11, 37. 
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archival evidence.356  Instead, he presciently gave an account 
that has withstood the subsequent publication of a fair 
amount of of eighteenth-century Massachusetts judicial 
records,357 and remains the accepted explanation to this 
day.358 
Grinnell’s explanation turned on the impact of England’s 
Glorious Revolution on Massachusetts.359  In the run up to the 
Revolution, one of James II’s arbitrary acts was to instigate 
judicial proceedings that in 1684 revoked the Colony of 
Massachusetts Bay’s charter and transferred the colony’s 
governance directly into his hands.360  After the revolutionary 
tumult subsided, England’s new regime reconstituted 
Massachusetts in 1692 by merging the formerly separate 
colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Maine, Nantucket, 
Martha’s Vineyard and parts of Nova Scotia into a new entity, 
the Province of Massachusetts Bay.361 
As a general matter, the Province government was more 
tightly bound to England’s imperial structure and more 
closely supervised by London than the colony had been.362  
More than before, the Province’s governors were the Crown’s 
agents.  As the Governors appointed provincial judges, the 
judges also were viewed as representing the imperial, rather 
than the local, government to a greater degree than before 
the Glorious Revolution.  According to Grinnell, this shift in 
the locus of government affected the colonist’s perspective on 
juries and bench trials.  “While they had their own judges 
under the colony,” he said, 
 356. For a contrasting example, see infra text accompanying notes 379–80 
(discussing Erwin Griswold’s analysis).  
 357. See material cited infra note 391.  
 358. See Towne, supra note 61, at 128–29 (giving essentially the same 
analysis as Grinnell). 
 359. See Grinnell, supra note 59, at 30–33. 
 360. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 30; John Hassam, Account of the Early 
Suffolk Recorders, 12 PROC.  MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 203, 234–36 (1899); Towne, 
supra note 61, at 128.  The colony’s establishment of Harvard College was 
among the grounds for forfeiting its charter, for the colony had not been granted 
power to create a corporation. 
 361. Province of Massachusetts Bay, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Province_of_Massachusetts_Bay (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
 362. See John Lund, The Contested Will of “Goodman Penn”: Anglo-New 
England Politics, Culture, and Legalities, 1688-1716, 27 L. & HIST. 549, 556–57, 
568, 579, 582–84 (2009) (discussing cross-currents in London’s program of 
seeking greater control over Massachusetts). 
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they provided expressly for an optional right to jury trial 
and exercised it as such; but when they had judges under 
the Province Charter whom they thought would be under 
the influence of the crown they tried to emphasize their 
desire to have all questions of fact tried by juries . . . .363 
Indeed, the desire to emphasize the sanctity of jury trial 
was exacerbated by the developing conflict over the Privy 
Council’s policy of enforcing the trade laws in Admiralty 
courts where defendants had no right to jury trial.364  In this 
new era of less locally-identified government and Navigation 
Act enforcement, which lasted up to the Revolution, the 
colonists’ focus of concern was “with the question of a man’s 
right to a jury when he asked for it.”365  “[P]resumably nobody 
bothered about [the] question of any one’s wanting to waive a 
jury,” Grinnell concluded, and soon the “optional character of 
the right to a jury established . . . by the common law of 
Massachusetts in the colonial period” faded from “general 
knowledge.”366 
Given that both Judge Bond and Frank Grinnell were 
staunch supporters of reforming twentieth century law to 
permit a defendant’s jury waiver, their frank 
acknowledgment of the limits of their historical findings must 
be admired.367  Nonetheless, in the “criminal justice is in 
crisis” atmosphere of the 1920s, some reform-minded lawyers 
were far less circumspect when they drew from Bond’s and 
 363. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 32. 
 364. Id. 
 365.  Id. at 33 (emphasis removed). 
 366. Id.  Many factors contributed to the fading of the collective memory, 
including the fact that the 1641 Body of Liberties was never printed and the 
manuscript copies were lost.  Id.  One copy was discovered in the Boston library 
in 1843 and received its first printing at that time.  Id. at 22. 
 367. Without detracting from Bond’s and Grinnell’s scholarly restraint, I 
must note that they had less need to overstate their conclusions.  Bond was a 
judge in one of the few states where waiver-based jury trial was already allowed 
so his limited conclusion did not matter to practice in his own state.  Grinnell 
thought his historical findings grounded an argument that defendant’s jury 
waiver was permitted by the current Massachusetts constitution.  Basically, his 
contention was that optional jury trial was made a part of Massachusetts’s 
“fundamental” law shortly after the colony’s founding; under a strict 
interpretation of successive state constitutions, the optional right had never 
been repealed; and it had been preserved in the forms of trial procedure when 
defendants were asked, until 1835, how they wished to be tried.  See Grinnell, 
supra note 59, at 12–14, 33–38, 49. 
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Grinnell’s work and the work of other historians.  S. 
Chesterfield Oppenheim, for example, writing in the 
Michigan Law Review in 1927 claimed, “Researches in legal 
history have thrown grave doubt upon, if not dispelled, the 
traditional idea that a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions 
was intended as an exclusive mode of determining the fate of 
the accused.” 368  And, as the fruits of historical research 
permeated the 1920s legal consciousness, commentators 
began to assert, without any need for citation, “From the 
traditional viewpoint, the jury has been regarded as the sole 
historical method of trial both in England and in colonial 
America.  Legal research indicates, however, that an option 
was offered between waiver of jury and jury trial both in 
England and in colonial America.”369 
Perhaps the most egregious use of Bond’s and Grinnell’s 
research was made by Erwin Griswold when, as a young 
lawyer working in the Solicitor General’s Office, 370  he  
wrote the historical section of the brief the United States  
submitted in the Patton case.371  In the brief,372 Griswold 
 368. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696 (citing Grinnell, supra note 59, 
among others); see also id. at 697 (“It is also likely that the legal profession 
generally has been too confident in the assumption that in the colonial period of 
American history, criminal offenses of misdemeanor and felony grade were 
always tried by a jury.”); id. at 698 n.9 (citing Grinnell’s and Bond’s articles); 
Recent Decisions, supra note 61, at 1064 (saying Grinnell’s and Bond’s research 
“is of some significance”). 
 369. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 163.  But see Perkins, supra note 33, at 21–
22 (evenhanded discussion of Bond’s and Grinnell’s scholarship). 
 370. At the time, Griswold was three years out of Harvard Law School, 
having graduated summa cum laude in 1927.  Dennis Hevesi, Erwin Griswold 
Is Dead at 90; Served as a Solicitor General, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at B10, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/21/obituaries/erwin-griswold-is 
-dead-at-90-served-as-a-solicitor-general.html?scp=1&sq=Erwin%20Griswold%2 
0is%20dead%20at%2090&st=cse.  Griswold was to become one of the leading 
figures in twentieth century American law and legal education.  Id.  He served 
as Dean of the Harvard Law School for twenty-one years, from 1946 to 1967 and 
left that position to serve as Solicitor General of the United States from 1976 to 
1973 under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.  Id.  Although he was a life-long 
Republican, as early as 1950 he opposed McCarthy; in the 1960s, he was among 
the first law professors to defend the Warren Court’s reform of criminal 
procedure; and he was an ardent supporter of civil rights who testified as an 
expert for the NAACP and on behalf of Thurgood Marshall’s appointment to the 
Supreme Court.  Id. 
 371. Griswold is listed as an “Attorney” on the brief.  See Brief for the United 
States, supra note 292, at 68.  I attribute the historical section to Griswold 
because four years later he published a slightly expanded version as a law 
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described Bond’s work on Maryland without mentioning, as 
Bond had,373 that all Maryland nonjury trials before the 1820s 
were for misdemeanors and “chiefly in minor cases.”374  Not 
only did he avoid explicitly stating the implicit limit on 
Maryland’s colonial bench-trial practice, but he concluded his 
discussion of Maryland with the observation that: 
The Maryland practice since the eighteenth century has 
had a continuous development into the modern trial by the 
court.  In the year 1923 over 90 per cent of all cases tried 
in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City were tried 
without a jury under this procedure which finds its origin 
quite definitely in the provincial practice.375 
To describe the singular history of Maryland bench trials 
as having a “continuous development” and an “origin . . . in 
provincial practice” is literally true.  However, it masks the 
critically significant fact that Maryland’s experience with 
waiver-based bench trials did not involve felonies until almost 
forty years after the Founding. 
As for Massachusetts, Griswold’s brief recounted in great 
detail the precedents Grinnell discussed in his 1923 article.  
Griswold’s account was “summarized from Mr. Grinnell’s 
article with a few additions.”376  Because all the additions 
were cases found in the Records of the Court of Assistants,377 
none of them came from a period later than 1692.378  Thus 
review article.  See Griswold, supra note 54.  The expansion involved adding a 
section on the English background.  Id. at 658–60.  The section on colonial 
America is taken almost verbatim from the brief.  Compare id. at 660–69, with 
Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 33–47.  The only noticeable 
difference is the order in which a couple of the colonies are discussed.  In the 
article, Griswold never revealed his participation in the Patton litigation.  See 
infra text accompanying note 441. 
 372. The following remarks on the brief are true about the subsequent 
article, too.  I will give parallel cites to both discussions. 
 373. See supra text accompanying notes 338–39. 
 374. Bond, supra note 263, at 701.  For Griswold’s discussion of Maryland, 
see Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 42–46.  See also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 667–69. 
 375. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 46; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 669. 
 376. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 34; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 660 n.24. 
 377. The additional cases involve William Pope and Joseph Homes Senior 
and Junior.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 38–39; Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 663. 
 378. See supra text accompanying note 352 (recounting that the Court of 
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just like Grinnell, Griswold faced the problem of accounting 
for the apparent end of waiver-based bench trials at the end 
of the seventeenth century.  But unlike Grinnell, Griswold did 
not tie the end of Massachusetts bench trials to the change 
from the Colony to the Province of Massachusetts Bay, nor 
mention that Grinnell had.379  Rather, Griswold embraced the 
explanation that Grinnell spurned.  According to Griswold, 
the apparent end of Massachusetts bench trials after 1692 
“may be explained by the fact that no records of criminal 
cases in this period have been printed, and is, no evidence 
that the practice did not continue.”380 
It is now seventy years after Griswold’s writing, and the 
subsequent publication of additional volumes of provincial 
Massachusetts court records has yet to support Griswold’s 
speculative explanation.381  Yet Griswold’s suggestion was 
plausible when it was made in 1930.  Grinnell’s nuanced 
consideration of countervailing facts382 was not necessarily a 
more convincing account.  This was especially so since 
Griswold’s claim that colonial archives had yet to be explored 
was complemented by new examples of jury waiver that  
he uncovered through “extended research”383 into the few 
published records of the rest of the colonies.  Merely by 
reading the random assortment of existing published legal 
material from other colonies, Griswold discovered “examples 
of waiver of jury”384  in four more colonies as well as in 
colonial-era Vermont. 
Going from the earliest and least important to the latest 
and most important findings, Griswold’s research found the 
Assistants’s records continue until 1969 when the Court was dissolved).  
 379. See supra text accompanying notes 359–66 (discussing Grinnell). 
 380. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 39; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 663. 
 381. See, e.g., 1–16 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686–1859 (David Konig ed. 
1978–82); JOSEPH SMITH, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS, 
1639–1702: THE PYNCHON COURT RECORD (1961); William Jeffrey, Early New 
England Court Records - A Bibliography of Published Materials, 1 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 119, 127–40 (1957) (discussing Massachusetts).  Manuscript records also 
have been made more accessible through the publication of finding guides. 
 382. See supra text accompanying notes 359–66 (discussing Grinnell). 
 383. Griswold, supra note 54, at 669. 
 384. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 34; see also id. at 42 
(covering New Jersey even though it is not mentioned on Griswold’s list on the 
page cited). 
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following additional examples of jury waiver: 
(a) New Hampshire - a 1679 statute that seemed to 
provide for waiver-based bench trial but which never went 
into force because it did not receive royal assent;385 
(b) Pennsylvania - one case dating from 1685 which 
involved a bench trial following a guilty plea;386 
(c) New Jersey - a 1738 statute “authorizing any two 
magistrates to try persons charged with larceny of goods 
under the value of twenty shillings” which remained in 
effect throughout the colonial era and into the nineteenth 
century;387 
(d) Vermont - one “trial held July 1, 1779 [that] was before 
the court without a jury;”388 and 
(e) Connecticut - three criminal cases tried in the 1790s 
involving “serious crimes” which “allow[ed] a defendant to 
waive his right to trial by jury.”389 
From our perspective, Griswold’s additional findings may 
seem remarkably thin and insubstantial, perhaps because 
decades of additional colonial-record publishing and  
research has added very little to them.390  In addition, some  
of Griswold’s findings have been debunked.391  Given the 
 385. Id. at 40–41; see also Griswold, supra note 54, at 664. 
 386. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 46; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 666.  The proceeding in the Pennsylvania case mirrored the 
English practice of “submission,” which was permitted for trials of minor 
misdemeanors.  See Bond, supra note 263, at 699–700 (discussing colonial 
Maryland’s submission practice); Griswold, supra note 54, at 658–59; Towne, 
supra note 61, at 136–38. 
 387. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 42; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 666. 
 388. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 40; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 664. 
 389. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 41; see also Griswold, 
supra note 54, at 665. 
 390. See, e.g., Towne, supra note 61, at 131 (additional colonial Connecticut 
statutes authorizing jury waiver which were limited to misdemeanors).  A sense 
of the scope of colonial court records published since the 1930s may be seen by 
consulting Jeffrey, supra note 381; William Jeffrey, Early American Court 
Records - A Bibliography of Printed Materials: The Middle Colonies, 39 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 685 (1970).  The Internet has made even more material widely 
available.  See Morris Cohen, Researching Legal History in the Digital Age, 99 
L. LIB. J. 377 (2007). 
 391. See, e.g., Towne, supra note 61, at 133–34 (suggesting New Hampshire’s 
statute did not apply to criminal prosecutions); id. at 144 (saying New Jersey’s 
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limitation of Maryland’s bench trial practice to misdemeanors 
and the cessation of Massachusetts’s waiver-based bench 
trials at the end of the seventeenth century, Connecticut 
seems to be the only jurisdiction that permitted waiver-based 
bench trials for serious crimes during the Founding era.392 
Nevertheless, in 1930, Bond’s, Grinnell’s, and Griswold’s 
discoveries were new, exciting, and may reasonably have been 
thought to hold promise of more to come.  This was especially 
so in light of how few colonial records had been printed and 
studied.393 
Griswold began the historical section of the government’s 
brief with the modestly suggestive caption: “Waiver of trial by 
jury, even in trials for serious offenses, was not unknown at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”394  He ended the 
section, however, with a stronger statement.  Given the 
existence of colonial-era bench trials:  
Recognition of the right of waiver in cases where  
the defendant deemed it to be his interest so to do  
could not . . . have been regarded as inconsistent with the 
institution of trial by jury . . . .  [T]he judicial history of 
the Colonies indicates that there was no sentiment 
against waiver of such a right.  The practice of waiver 
being known, stronger language would have been used [in 
the Constitution] had there been any intention to preclude 
it.395 
In contrast to the Government’s brief, which had 
historically-informed sections focused on colonial and 
Founding-era material, the defendant’s brief relied entirely 
on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century federal 
statute “authorized a waiver of nonjury trial, rather than waiver of jury trial”); 
id. (“not clear what [the] Vermont case represents”). 
 392. The Connecticut practice was a rarity and it ended by the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  Id. at 145.  The results of twentieth-century research into 
the history of bench trial may be summarized as follows: in the seventeenth 
century, a few of the colonies permitted bench trials.  See Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 24, 29–31 (1965); Towne, supra note 61, at 124–45.  By the 
eighteenth century, bench trial practice survived in Connecticut, where it was a 
rarity, and in Maryland, where it was more frequent but confined to 
“misdemeanor cases.”  See Singer, 380 U.S. at 30 (no bench trial in Maryland in 
a “major case” until 1823); Towne, supra note 61, 131–32, 142. 
 393. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 33–34 (implicitly 
making this argument); Griswold, supra note 54, at 669. 
 394. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 33. 
 395. Id. at 47. 
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precedents, state precedents, and two treatise writers.396  It 
contained no discussion of the English common law or of the 
colonial and Founding eras.  Defendant’s counsel provided no 
history to counter Griswold’s, nor any analysis of Griswold’s 
sources to limit what he said.  Defendant’s reliance on 
precedent was understandable; their failure to treat the issue 
historically was shortsighted. 
4. Sutherland’s Agreement with the Historical Critique 
of the No-Waiver Rule 
Before the Patton litigation, Justice Sutherland may or 
may not have known about the 1920s historical critique of the 
no-waiver rule’s claim to be the intended rule of the Founding 
generation.  If not, he certainly learned about it during the 
Supreme Court’s proceedings from the government’s oral 
argument397 as well from its brief.398  In deciding Patton, 
Sutherland clearly expressed his agreement with the 
Government’s version of the no-waiver rule’s emergent 
history by noting, with words nearly identical to Griswold’s,399 
that “in the Colonies such a waiver and trial by the court 
without a jury was by no means unknown, as the many 
references contained in the brief of the Solicitor General 
conclusively show.”400 
Sutherland made this remark during his discussion of 
whether the federal common law should permit jury waiver.401  
He made it as his initial argument countering the force  
of his admission that jury waiver was not permitted at  
common law.402  It may be surprising that Sutherland had not 
mentioned the new historical findings earlier in his opinion as 
part of his analysis of jury waiver’s constitutionality.  
 396. See Brief of Appellants at ii, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 
(1930) (No. 53) (Index to Authorities). 
 397. Patton, 281 U.S. at 281–82 (argument of counsel).  The pages of the U.S. 
Reports cited here, which contain the counsel’s argument, are omitted from 
Westlaw’s reproduction of the case report.  See id. at 276. 
 398. See supra text accompanying notes 373–95 (discussing the government’s 
brief). 
 399. See Patton, 281 U.S. at 281 (argument of Solicitor General Hughes); 
supra text accompanying note 394 (discussing the government’s brief). 
 400. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306. 
 401. See supra text accompanying note 317 (discussing Sutherland’s views on 
whether the federal common law should permit jury waiver). 
 402. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306. 
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Perhaps Sutherland omitted mentioning them then because 
of limitations in the material originalists of his day thought 
appropriate evidence for constitutional argument.  Until the 
modern originalist movement in the 1970s, originalist 
Justices generally drew their arguments from a limited array 
of sources, such as Madison’s notes, the Federalist papers, 
and treatises discussing the common law.  They did not delve 
into Founding-era practices even when contemporaneous 
practice provided convincing evidence of the issue under 
consideration.403 
Whatever reason Sutherland had for not mentioning the 
emergent history as part of his constitutional analysis, the 
question here is whether Sutherland knew and agreed with 
the 1920s historical critique of the no-waiver rule’s claim to 
be the Founding generation’s intended rule.  There can be no 
doubt that he did.  When Sutherland decided Patton, he had 
absorbed what Griswold wrote in the government’s brief and 
agreed that jury waiver was “by no means unknown” at the 
Founding.404 
5. Sutherland’s Patton Opinion and Motivated 
Reasoning 
The ultimate question is what influence the societal 
demand for jury waiver, the attack on the no-waiver rule’s 
claim to be a wise rule of contemporary public policy, the 
emergent body of historical scholarship questioning the  
no-waiver rule’s claim to be the Founding generation’s  
intended rule had on Patton’s ruling upholding jury  
waiver’s constitutionality.  Given Sutherland’s originalist 
jurisprudence,405 only the historical critique should have had 
any influence.  That critique, however, was only incipient.  By 
 403. The petty crime exception to Article III’s jury trial mandate is an 
illustrative example.  Compare Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904) 
(relying on Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES and Madison’s notes), and Callan v. 
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888) (relying on Story’s COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION and Madison’s notes), with Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 
10, at 917 (passim) (showing common law practices evidencing the petty crime 
exception).  Perhaps the material originalists like Sutherland relied on reflects 
their focus on Framer intent rather than on original understanding or original 
public meaning.  Perhaps it reflects limitations in readily available material. 
 404. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306. 
 405. See supra text accompanying notes 183–91 (discussing Sutherland’s 
jurisprudence). 
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itself, the new historical information would likely have been 
insufficient to overturn the Constitution’s clear text and one-
hundred-forty years of constitutional practice and precedent 
on the subject. 
None of these developments when viewed in isolation 
should have been sufficient for Sutherland to reject the no-
waiver rule.  But all together—the social need and societal 
demand, the strong policy preference, and the new and 
suggestive history—may have had a synergy that was greater 
than any of its component parts.  The new history may have 
provided an opening that allowed Sutherland with a complete 
sense of rectitude to find his, and his society’s, desired 
outcome in the Constitution’s original meaning.  Sutherland’s 
Patton opinion was either an intellectually bankrupt, 
meretricious example of “phony originalism”406 or a classic 
example of the phenomenon psychologists call “motivated 
reasoning.” 
Ultimately, there are no indubitable grounds for 
preferring one explanation for Sutherland’s judgment over 
the other.  The remarkable weakness of his constitutional 
analysis suggests a result-oriented explanation.  Yet, there 
are indicia of the influence of motivated reasoning.  Due to 
these indicia, the motivated reasoning explanation will be 
explored because it paints more sympathetic portrait of 
Sutherland as a conscientious Justice while, at the same 
time, posing a more challenging problem for the practice of 
originalist jurisprudence. 
a. Motivated Reasoning 
Motivated reasoning is an umbrella term for a complex of 
psychological mechanisms that pervasively influences human 
reasoning, creating the tendency for individuals to utilize a 
variety of cognitive mechanisms to arrive, through a process 
of apparently unbiased reasoning, at the conclusion they 
privately desired to arrive at all along.407  That a preference 
 406. Koppelman, supra note 259, at 749.  An example of what Koppelman 
describes as “phony originalism” is Justice Thomas’s selective citation to “the 
findings of originalist scholarship that support the result he is inclined to 
reach—sweeping contrary evidence under the rug—while claiming that he is 
merely following the intentions of the Framers.”  Id. at 742–43. 
 407. Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
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for a particular outcome unconsciously biases reasoning 
processes is such a wide-spread, habitual, and persistent 
human trait that observers suggest it is an “inherent”408 and 
“immutable characteristic of human nature”409 that serves a 
variety of important psychic functions.  Motivated reasoning 
promotes psychological comfort by reducing dissonance 
among a person’s various beliefs410 and between what she 
desires and what she thinks is true and moral.411  Motivated 
reasoning also allows people to maintain a positive, 
consistent, up-right self-image while seeking what they 
want.412  Whatever its function, motivated reasoning is so 
strong, pervasive, and subtle that research shows that “even 
people’s sincere efforts to find the correct answer are biased 
by their predispositions.”413 
Among the biasing cognitive processes most associated 
with motivated reasoning are tendencies to 
(a) remember or look for evidence supporting the desired 
conclusion rather than rebutting evidence or evidence of 
disfavored outcomes;414 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 653 (1999).  The classic 
article in the extensive social psychology literature is Kunda, supra note 21, at 
480. See also EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY 
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 13–79 (2009); THOMAS GILOVICH, 
HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE 75–94 (1991).  For discussions in legal literature, see, e.g., 
Hanson & Kysar, supra, at 653–54; Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the 
Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 259–84 (discussing 
“unconscious processes,” including “motivated reasoning”); Christopher 
Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 307, 352–59 (2001). 
 408. Frank Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 197 n.77 
(2008) (book review) (describing motivated reasoning as an “inherent 
psychological attitude”). 
 409. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 407, at 654; see also id. at 633 (“cognitive 
illusions,” which include motivated reasoning, affect the human reasoning 
process “with uncanny consistency and unflappable persistence”). 
 410. Kunda, supra note 21, at 483–85 (discussing “dissonance theory”). 
 411. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Problems Created 
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 995–97 (2009). 
 412. Kunda, supra note 21, at 485–86; Donald Langevoort, Ego, Human 
Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 855–56 (1995); David Yosifon, The 
Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 259, 265–66 (2009). 
 413. Frank Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 
1406 n.54 (2009). 
 414. Kunda, supra note 21, at 481–83, 485; Timothy Malloy, Disclosure 
Stories, 32 F.S.U. L. REV. 617, 652–53 (2005). 
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(b) exaggerate the persuasiveness of evidence supporting 
the desired conclusion while minimizing the 
persuasiveness of evidence rebutting it or favoring other 
outcomes;415 
(c) require more proof of disfavored conclusions while 
requiring less proof of a favored outcome;416 and 
(d) allocate the burden of proof to disfavored conclusions 
while granting a presumption of validity to the favored 
outcome.417 
In addition, the more one needs to make a decision under 
time  pressure,418  initially  favors  a  particular  outcome,419 
“faces weak consequences for being wrong,”420 or thinks an 
issue is important,421 difficult,422 or open,423 the more likely it 
 415. Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope: 
Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUT. L. REV. 919, 964 (2008) (“The 
psychological concept of ‘motivated reasoning’ theorizes that people will perceive 
information supportive of their pre-existing beliefs as more legitimate than that 
contradicting their preferences”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 407, at 646; 
Kunda, supra note 21, at 489–91. 
 416. Susan Bandes, Protecting the Innocent as the Primary Value of the 
Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413, 420 (2009).  As Anthony 
Page writes: 
How then does motivated reasoning occur?  Gilovich suggests that 
decision makers in fact ask a different question depending on how 
eager they are to reach a particular conclusion.  “For desired 
conclusions . . . it is as if we ask ourselves ‘Can I believe this?,’ but for 
unpalatable conclusions we ask, ‘Must I believe this?’ ”   The legal 
analog would be that for desired conclusions one asks, “Could a 
reasonable person believe it?” whereas for undesirable conclusions one 
asks, “Would all reasonable people believe it?” The burden of 
persuasion is much lower for the first question. 
Page, supra note 407, at 264. 
 417. See, e.g., Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect 
Beliefs About Its Unconstitutionality?: An Experimental Test, 32 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 219, 220 (2008); Page, supra note 407, at 262–65.  For a discussion of 
the multitude of processes through which motivated reasoning works, see 
GILOVICH, supra note 407, at 78–84. 
 418. Kunda, supra note 21, at 481; Glen Whitman & Roger Koppl, Rational 
Bias in Forensic Science, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 69, 84 (2010). 
 419. Kunda, supra note 21, at 492–93. 
 420. Whitman & Koppl, supra note 418, at 84. 
 421. Susan A. Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange 
Persistence of the American Death Penalty, 42 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 21, 35, 40 
(2008) (discussing reasoning “when . . . attitudes are deeply held” or “intense 
emotional investment”). 
 422. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of 
Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1513 (2010). 
 423. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
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is that motivated reasoning will control the judgment 
reached. 
There are limits to motivated reasoning’s power and its 
distorting effect is subject to constraints.  As Ziva Kunda 
writes, “[p]eople do not seem to be at liberty to conclude 
whatever they want to conclude;” 424 there must be sufficient 
grounds to “maintain an illusion of objectivity.” 425   The 
psychic goal is to appear open-minded, even-handed, and 
“rational” while so far as possible “construct[ing] a 
justification of [the] desired conclusion that would persuade a 
dispassionate observer.”426  Due to the need to appear neutral, 
one of the most prominent constraints on motivated reasoning 
arises when a person knows that her conclusions and 
supporting arguments will be reviewed by others.427  This 
knowledge heightens awareness that the reasons propounded 
must be stronger so they can be plausible to a variety of 
people with different preconceptions of their own.428 
Unfortunately, external review is not a satisfactory 
constraint for motivated reasoning.429  Research also shows 
that thinking hard about an issue does not necessarily  
eliminate or moderate the biasing effect of motivated 
reasoning.430   Indeed, there is evidence that “extensive 
processing caused by [the desire to be accurate] may facilitate 
the construction of justifications for desired conclusions.  
Thus people expecting to incur heavier costs if their desired 
beliefs turn about to be wrong may expend greater effort to 
justify these desired beliefs.”431 
In other words, although external review and 
deliberation over an issue may moderate the distortions of 
motivated reasoning, they may also exacerbate the problem 
by increasing the resources, effort, and creativity devoted to 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 433 (2002); Baum, supra note 422, at 1513 
(discussing uncertainty); Feldman & Teichman, supra note 411, at 995–96. 
 424. Kunda, supra note 21, at 482.  For the material in this paragraph see 
also Furgeson et al., supra note 417, at 220; Kunda, supra note 21, at 482–83, 
490; Page, supra note 407, at 264–65. 
 425. Kunda, supra note 21, at 483 (internal quotation marks removed). 
 426. Id. at 482–83; see also id. at 490. 
 427. Id. at 481. 
 428. Id. at 493. 
 429. Id. at 481, 493.  
 430. Id. at 493. 
 431. Id. at 487; see also id. at 490. 
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reaching decisions that are consistent with initial 
preferences.  In the end, external review and self-reflection 
may lead not to compromise but to “to the solidifying (or 
ossifying) of individual opinion . . . [and] the polarization of 
group opinion.”432 
b. Justice Sutherland’s Patton Opinion as an 
Example of Motivated Reasoning 
Motivated reasoning already has been illustrated in this 
Article by the non-historian lawyers who exaggerated the 
implications of Bond’s and Grinnell’s work and felt 
comfortable asserting that the no-waiver rule’s historical 
foundations had been thoroughly repudiated.433  Motivated 
reasoning also is illustrated by Patton’s favorable reception in 
the legal community and the absence of contemporary 
criticism of Sutherland’s constitutional analysis.434  In a time 
when fidelity to the Constitution’s original meaning was still 
the dominant constitutional norm, it is telling that there was 
no public or scholarly claim that the case should have come 
out the other way, even by commentators who noted that 
Patton “reverses the doctrine of earlier Federal cases.”435  
Post-Patton, the conventional view seems to be that the 
Constitution’s criminal trial “provisions would seem to be 
mandatory in nature and for many years were so construed 
by the federal courts.  However, the case of Patton v. United 
States . . . took the opposite view and dispelled any doubt that 
had previously existed.”436 
 
 432. Bandes, supra note 421, at 40. 
 433. See supra text accompanying notes 368–69 (discussing 1920s lawyers 
who opposed the no-waiver rule). 
 434. Grant, supra note 34, at 156 is the only critical commentary I have 
uncovered and he merely suggests the case’s “theory” is unsound and predicts 
that “common sense” will confine Patton’s ruling to the “waiver of one or two 
jurors and not a waiver of jury trial.”  Grant’s prediction was wrong.  See supra 
text accompanying note 180 (discussing Patton’s extension to complete waiver). 
 435. Recent Decisions, supra note 61, at 1064; see also Grant, supra note 34, 
at 149–53; Perkins, supra note 33, at 43–47.  Grant did not hesitate to severely 
criticize Sutherland’s analysis of whether congressional statute granted trial 
courts authority to conduct bench trials.  Grant, supra note 34, at 153–56.  Yet 
Grant’s commentary on Sutherland’s constitutional analysis was a supportive 
“[t]his may be true enough.”  Id. at 153.  
 436. Handley, supra note 266, at 48. 
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Perhaps the heights of motivated reasoning were reached 
by Erwin Griswold when, four years after the Patton decision, 
he turned the historical analysis he had written for the 
government’s brief into a law review article.437  Although 
Griswold was now writing as a scholar rather than an 
advocate, the only new material he added to the brief was an 
acknowledgment that Patton “must have seemed to many like 
a departure from a position once thought well settled,”438  
and a claim that the “ample evidence” contained in his  
article “furnish[es] a sure historical basis for the decision.”439  
Without divulging his role in the litigation, Griswold assured 
his readers that the Patton decision “represent[ed] no 
departure from the Constitution as the framers intended it”440 
and found “its sound basis, not only in the reasons advanced 
by the Court, but also in the history of the period when the 
Constitution was formulated.”441 
What about Sutherland?  Having a marked policy 
preference favoring jury waiver,442 he may be described as 
highly motivated to rule that way.  In addition, Sutherland 
could anticipate that there would be little criticism of his 
opinion should he find jury waiver constitutional because jury 
waiver was by far the more popular outcome.443  To the extent 
that criticism is a constraint on motivated reasoning, it would 
not be operative in this situation. 
Still, Sutherland’s conception of the judge’s role 
counseled against reading his policy preferences into the 
Constitution.  Since he was an originalist, only his agreement 
with the no-waiver rule’s emergent history should have 
affected his judgment.  But that history was only suggestive 
and Sutherland never expressly connected his belief that jury 
waiver “was by no means unknown”444 in the colonies and 
 437. Griswold, supra note 54; see also supra text accompanying notes 370–95 
(discussing the government’s Patton brief). 
 438. Griswold, supra note 54, at 656. 
 439. Id.  
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. See supra text accompanying notes 304–20. 
 443. Sutherland, of course, wrote many opinions that were criticized in his 
time.  But I suspect those opinions, though criticized by many, had far more 
support than Patton would have had had it come out the other way. 
 444. See supra text accompanying note 400. 
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early Republic with his constitutional analysis.445 
In light of the strength of Sutherland’s predisposition 
toward permitting jury waiver, studies of motivated 
reasoning suggest that it would take very little evidence to 
convince him, to make him sincerely believe, that jury waiver 
was the “intended” constitutional rule.  Due to the biasing 
effect of motivated reasoning, it would have taken compelling 
evidence to overcome Sutherland’s natural tendency to (1) 
presume the pro-waiver position was constitutionally correct, 
(2) look for evidence favoring that position, and, finally, (3) 
exaggerate the significance of the evidence he found.  This 
description of Sutherland’s natural inclination describes 
fairly well what the analysis above shows to have occurred in 
Sutherland’s opinion. 
Sutherland’s constitutional analysis began with a 
discussion of prior precedent that was a negative argument 
focused on showing that the no-waiver position was 
unreasonable.446  The argument’s unstated purpose was to set 
up the pro-waiver position as the only position that a rational 
Framer or delegate to a ratifying convention could have held. 
Sutherland short positive argument, which takes up only 
two pages in the United States Reports, shows that it did not 
take much evidence to convince him to rule in favor of jury 
waiver.  All that was involved was Founding era silence, 
Blackstone’s and Story’s description of the defendant’s right 
of jury trial as a “privilege” and the more permissive 
draftsmanship of Sixth Amendment.  Sutherland found that 
this woefully inadequate evidence was sufficient to place the 
burden of proof on those wishing to retain the no-waiver 
rule 447  and made it “reasonable to conclude” that the 
Founders meant to establish jury trial as a waivable privilege 
in the absence of a statement that they wanted the no-waiver 
rule.448 
 445. The remark was made as part of Sutherland’s discussion of whether the 
no-waiver rule should be adopted as a matter of federal common law.  
Sutherland took up that discussion only after (and because) he had ruled that 
jury waiver was permitted by the Constitution. 
 446. See supra text accompanying notes 200–08. 
 447. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930) (Justice Sutherland 
suggesting Founding era silence on the question of jury waiver cuts against 
finding that rule was established by the Constitution). 
 448. Id.  
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Together, Sutherland’s negative and positive arguments, 
which were deployed to support the remarkable conclusion 
that the Framer’s misdrafted Article III’s jury provision so 
that its words were more “imperative” than they meant,449 
read as a textbook example of how Thomas Gilovich says 
motivated reasoning operates.  “It is clear,” he says: 
that we tend to use different criteria to evaluate 
propositions or conclusions we desire, and those we abhor.  
For propositions we want to believe, we ask only that the 
evidence does not force us to believe otherwise—a rather 
easy standard to meet given the equivocal nature of much 
information . . . .  For desired conclusions . . . it is as if we 
ask ourselves, “Can I believe this?”450 
Sutherland’s review of prior precedent in Patton, by 
showing that reasonable Framers would favor jury waiver, 
implicitly functioned to place a very light burden of proof on 
arguments favoring that outcome and a correspondingly 
heavy burden on the no-waiver principle by intimating that 
only irrational Framers would ordain such a rule.  
Sutherland’s positive argument expressly functioned the 
same way.  Given the reduced burden of proof, Sutherland 
may have felt that it was met by the arguments he presented 
from Blackstone, Story, and the Sixth Amendment.  
Certainly, the newly discovered evidence, mined from colonial 
archives and compiled in Griswold’s brief showing that jury 
waiver “was by no means unknown”451 in the Colonies, was 
sufficient to allow the pro-jury waiver position to meet the 
“Can I believe this?” standard.  Moreover, the emergent 
history was not only sufficient to meet the reduced standard, 
but it would do so with the added psychic benefit of 
demonstrating responsiveness to the latest trends in 
historical scholarship. 
 449. See id. (“The reasonable inference is that the concern of the framers of 
the Constitution was to make clear that the right of trial by jury should remain 
inviolable, to which end no language was deemed too imperative”). 
 450. GILOVICH, supra note 407, at 83–84 (emphasis in original).  Gilovich 
describes our approach to disfavored conclusions as “ask[ing] whether the 
evidence compels such a distasteful conclusion. . . . [I]t is as if we ask ourselves  
. . . “Must I believe this?”  Id. at 84 (emphasis in original). 
 451. See supra text accompanying note 400 (quoting Justice Sutherland). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the legal world of which 
Justice Sutherland was a part when he decided Patton v. 
United States.452  It has shown that in the decade before 
Patton there was a felt need to streamline the federal 
criminal-trial process by reducing the frequency of jury 
trial.453  At the same time, there was a new trend in historical 
scholarship 454  suggesting that prohibiting defendant’s jury 
waiver was not what the Founding generation intended when 
they wrote Article III’s peremptory command mandating that 
“all” federal criminal trials “shall be by jury.”455  In focusing 
on these developments, the immediate goal of this Article has 
been to put us in Justice Sutherland’s seat, to help us feel the 
pressures on him as he and his colleagues considered whether 
the traditional no-waiver rule was constitutionally required. 
In addition, this Article has demonstrated the impact of 
motivated reasoning on historical scholarship and on the use 
lawyers and judges make of it.456  Motivated reasoning helps 
set the historians’ research agenda, influences the discovery 
and interpretation of evidence, and strongly affects the 
reception and use of historical scholarship by lawyers, judges, 
and the public.457 
These findings raise grave concerns about the viability of 
originalist jurisprudence as it is practiced by the bench and 
bar.458  Originalist jurisprudence is supposed to constrain 
judges, to make constitutional law a matter of empirical 
discovery rather than discretionary judgments that permit 
judges to read their own values into the Constitution.459  Yet, 
if judges constantly, even if unconsciously, read their 
predilections into the historical record, originalist practice 
 452. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 276 (1930). 
 453. See supra text accompanying notes 263–303. 
 454. See supra text accompanying notes 323–95. 
 455. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 456. See supra text accompanying notes 323–404, 433–50. 
 457. See supra text accompanying notes  434–36 (discussing the favorable 
response to Patton). 
 458. I make no criticism on originalist theory per se except to say that a legal 
theory that cannot be practiced properly is not a viable theory. 
 459. See, e.g., Douglas Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 236–37 (2010); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). 
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undermines the very reason originalist theory posits for its 
existence.460 
Moreover, if judges are reading their predilections into 
the Constitution, whether meretriciously or because of 
motivated reasoning, we have an evolving Constitution that 
changes as the judges and their values change.  To the extent 
this evolution occurs under an originalist jurisprudence by 
which judges claim to discover how the Founding generation 
understood the Constitution’s text, our contemporary 
constitutionalism is in a situation that is similar to the 
predicament of private law jurisprudence at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
At that time, private law was dominated by a formalist 
jurisprudence that depicted new decisions as logical  
elaborations of past precedent.461  At the same time, jurists 
recognized that the common law was constantly evolving in 
tune with changing social norms and societal needs.462  To 
reconcile the conflict between their ideal beliefs and positive 
observations, nineteenth-century jurists developed a variety 
of related legal philosophies, collectively known as historical 
jurisprudence,463 that recognized legal change but depicted it 
as an instinctive and unconscious infusion of new principles 
adopted from the customary practices and developing norms 
of the people.464 
In other words, late-nineteenth century common law 
theorists acknowledged the inevitable evolutionary character 
 460. See Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 169, 170–73 (2009) (discussing originalism’s inability to constrain judicial 
decisions). 
 461. Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); 
Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and the 
Transformation of Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439, 446–48 (1982); 
Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 215, 221–24 
(1995). 
 462. See Stephen A. Siegel, Francis Wharton’s Orthodoxy: God, Historical 
Jurisprudence, and Classical Legal Thought, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 422, 426–
29, 432–36 (2004); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth Century 
Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1459–64, 1492–97, 1521–22. 
 463. David Rabban, The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth Century American 
Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 541 (2003); David Rabban, The 
Historiography of The Common Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1161 (2003); 
Siegel, Wharton’s Orthodoxy, supra note 462, at 432–35. 
 464. See, e.g., Siegel, Historism, supra note 462, at 1459–64, 1492–97, 1521–
22. 
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of private law.465  They recognized that private law changed 
along with social and economic development.  Since most law 
was judge made, they recognized that over time judges 
changed the law with their rulings.  Nonetheless, to cabin 
their admission, late-nineteenth century historical jurists 
insisted that common law evolution was slow, instinctive, and 
unconscious.  Although common law evolution was observable 
in retrospect, they insisted that each generation could not see 
that it was departing from its past.466 
Modern law sprang into being when Progressive jurists 
such as Holmes and Roscoe Pound asked: if law is an evolving 
product of the human mind, why not make it conscious and 
subject it to rational debate, rather than to the happenstance 
of unconscious and haphazard decisionmaking?  This is the 
burden of Holmes’s epoch-making essay, The Path of the 
Law,467 and Roscoe Pound’s seminal articles on Sociological 
 465. The remarks in this paragraph are drawn from the material cited in 
supra notes 461–63. 
 466. As Francis Wharton, one of the most prominent of these jurists wrote: 
[T]he common law as a whole, while it moves, moves so slowly and 
unobservedly, that though it occupies in each generation a position 
different from what it occupied in a prior generation, at no particular 
time can it be spoken of as in motion. It is in this respect like a glacier 
which is congealed and yet flows . . . . While the law moves thus 
unobservedly—while new rules come into existence no knows how, and 
no one knows when—it moves in complex sympathy with the 
conscience and genius of the people from whom it emanates . . . . So 
arises the common law, which, from its very nature fluctuates 
instinctively with the people whose sense of right it expresses, and 
whose needs it meets. And no code that is not in like manner 
declaratory of the popular sense of right and need can stand. 
FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW 99–100 (1884); see also Siegel, 
Wharton’s Orthodoxy, supra note 462, at 434–38 (analyzing Wharton’s remark). 
 467. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991 (1997).  In this essay, Holmes 
famously says: 
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history.  
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know 
the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know.  It is a part 
of the rational study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened 
scepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of 
those rules.  When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain 
and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just 
what is his strength.  But to get him out is only the first step.  The next 
is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal . . . . 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the 
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Jurisprudence.468 
For over one-hundred years we have lived with the 
recognition that the infusion of contemporary values into 
private law is inevitable and, if only for that reason, 
desirable.  In light of that insight, we have developed private 
law jurisprudences that valorize legal change when it is the 
product of conscious and articulated reasons.  Now that we 
know that evolution in public law is similarly inevitable, we 
must develop public law jurisprudences that embrace and 
grow from, rather than deny, the observation that the 
infusion of contemporary values into constitutional law is 
inevitable.  Since we have a living constitution, it is better 
that the principles guiding its evolution be subject to open 
debate rather than adopted unconsciously or pretextually 
through decisions that falsely claim to be logical elaborations 
of principles adopted by the Constitution-makers of 1789. 
 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 
Holmes, 1897, supra, at 468. 
 468. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence 
(pts. 1–3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 489 (1911–1912). 
